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The walls of the Palazzo Publico in Siena, Italy, are graced with Ambrogio
Lorenzetti's striking frescos contrasting the effects of "good government" and
"bad government" on fourteenth-century city life. In the city under good
government, men work to repair stately buildings, women socialize in the
streets, and merchants sell their wares in a busy marketplace. In the city under
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bad government, the buildings are crumbling, men stand idle (save one crafting
weapons), bandits terrorize the innocent, and the bodies of murder victims lie
in the streets. 1 The goals of urban policy, it appears, have not changed in over
six hundred years.
Over the past two decades, however, the conventional wisdom about how
to achieve these goals in American cities has been turned on its head. After
years of attributing the problems of urban decay and disorder to intractable
"root causes," city officials now embrace "root solutions" that seek to eliminate
these problems directly, regardless of their causes.2 A primary catalyst for this
change was the articulation in 1982 of the "broken windows" hypothesis by
George Kelling and James Q. Wilson.3 This now-familiar theory is that
uncorrected manifestations of disorder, even minor ones like broken windows,
signal a breakdown in the social order that accelerates neighborhood decline. 4
The response to this theory, and to a growing disillusionment with modem
policing practices generally,5 has been a proliferation of policies focusing on
public order, such as former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's "quality of life" and
"no tolerance" programs, as well as ubiquitous "community policing" efforts. 6
Broken windows policies have generated a vast legal literature, most of
which focuses on police efforts to restore order by enforcing criminal laws.
This scholarship falls into two broad, and overlapping, categories: First, "social
norms" scholars argue that order-maintenance policing strategies are needed to
1. Effetti del Buon Govemo, Ambrogio Lorenzetti, 1337-1340, fresco, Palazzo
Publico, Siena; Effetti del Cattivo Govemo, Ambrogio Lorenzetti, 1338-1340, fresco,
Palazzo Publico, Siena. Ironically, while the former remains in nearly pristine condition,
large sections of the latter have crumbled away over the years. See Ambrogio Lorenzetti's
Frescos in the Sala dei Nove, Palazzo Publico, Sienna, http://www.tulane.edu/-tluongo/
Lorenz/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2004).
2. See, e.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF
DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 126-27, 161 (1990) (distinguishing between "root
causes" of and "root solutions" to urban disorder).
3. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
4. Id. at 31-32.
5. The influence of the Broken Windows piece can hardly be overstated. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM D. VALENTE & DAVID J. MCCARTHY, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 835 (4th ed.
1992) (noting that the director of the U.S. Department of Justice's National Institute of
Justice has observed that Wilson and Kelling's article "has had a greater impact than any
other article in serious policing"); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of
Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551,
580 (1997) [hereinafter Livingston, Police Discretion] ("Broken Windows stimulated a flurry
of scholarship on the subject of order maintenance."). Still, it would be overly simplistic to
suggest that this magazine article alone revolutionized urban policing policy. Rather, the
piece grew out of, and complemented, a growing body of literature supporting older, "hands-
on," policing practices. See infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
6. See generally, e.g., COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY (Jack R. Greene
& Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1986); GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING
BROKEN WINDOws: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996);
Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5.
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shore up important nonlegal social controls. 7 As Dan Kahan has observed,
"[c]racking down on aggressive panhandling, prostitution, open gang activity
and other visible signs of disorder may be justifiable on this ground, since
disorderly behavior and the law's response to it are cues about the community's
attitude toward more serious forms of criminal wrongdoing."8 Second, and in
response, criminal procedure scholars concentrate primarily on the
constitutional questions raised by the discretion afforded police officers by
order-promoting criminal laws.9
Largely missing from the academic debate about these developments is a
discussion of the complex and important role of property regulation in order-
maintenance efforts. 10 To be fair, broken windows scholarship concentrates
primarily on policing strategies that are, in a sense, property regulations: they
seek to restore order by regulating public places-streets, parks, etc. I I But
7. See, e.g., SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 65-84; Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic
Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105
YALE L.J. 1165 (1996) [hereinafter Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct]; Dan M.
Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REv.
2477 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Influence]; Dan M. Kahan, Social Norms, Social
Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998) [hereinafter
Kahan, Social Norms]; Tracey L. Meares, Drugs: It's a Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U.
L. REv. 579, 589-93 (1997); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms o) Order
in the Inner City, 32 LAW & Soc. REv. 805 (1998) [hereinafter Meares & Kahan, Law and
(Norms o/) Order]; Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social
Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999). On
social norm theory generally, see, for example, ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY,
JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995);
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943 (1995); Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996); Symposium,
Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537
(1998).
8. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 7, at 351.
9. See, e.g., David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1063-64 (1999)
(characterizing the legal commentary on order-maintenance policies as "the New Discretion
Scholarship"); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REv. 291, 294 (1998) (asserting that order-
maintenance policies are "a loosely grouped set of initiatives in the area of crime and
punishment"); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan & Meares, Coming
Crisis] (predicting "demise" of the constitutional rules designed to "delimit the permissible
bounds of discretionary law-enforcement authority"); Livingston, Police Discretion, supra
note 5, at 591-672 (surveying criminal procedure cases relating to police discretion to
maintain public order).
10. But cf Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039,
1101-22 (2002) (discussing ways that property regulation can be used to control crime).
11. For example, the anti-gang-loitering law invalidated by the Supreme Court in City
of Chicago v. Morales had "zoning" characteristics; it was enforced only in "areas in which
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traditional private property regulations also affect order-maintenance efforts in
important, and understudied, ways. This Article attempts to fill that property
law gap in the public-order puzzle by tackling the complicated relationship
between property regulation and order-restoration efforts.
Property regulations shape the order of American cities in two very
different ways. First, some-housing and building codes and nuisance laws-
target the physical (and related social) disorders that signal, and contribute to,
urban decline. Second, others-zoning laws-define and construct the proper
ordering of urban land uses. It is hardly surprising that city officials eager to
curb disorder have seized upon the first, "disorder-suppression" function of
property regulation. Social scientists have long linked property conditions with
community health. 12 (Put most simply, the presence of an "eyesore" is a
negative indicator of neighborhood health, 13 as Wilson and Kelling's precursor
to spiraling disorder-the broken window-suggests.) Furthermore,
constitutional rules governing police discretion limit, for good or ill, a
community's ability to curb disorder through flexible criminal laws such as
loitering and vagrancy prohibitions. 14  Property regulation offers vast
enforcement flexibility without raising the same constitutional concerns,
making it all the more attractive to city officials.
American property regulations, however, do far more than suppress
disorder. Our most significant form of land-use regulation, Euclidean zoning,
also reflects a longstanding value judgment that the appropriate way to order
different land uses is to separate them from one another into single-use zones.
1 5
the presence of gang members ha[d] a demonstrable effect on the activities of law abiding
persons in the surrounding community." City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 48-49
(1999) (quoting Chicago Police Department General Order 92-4); see also Richard C.
Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REv. 371, 408 (2001) (noting that Chicago
used zoning characteristics to defend the ordinance). Other communities explicitly apply
zoning principles to public streets. The Supreme Court recently ruled that a public housing
authority could use trespass laws to exclude troublemakers. Virginia v. Hicks, 593 U.S. 113
(2003). Portland, Oregon, and Cincinnati, Ohio, have adopted similar ordinances that
exclude individuals from designated "drug exclusion zones" as a consequence of a drug
arrest within the zone. See Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal
Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1430-31 (2001) (discussing drug exclusion zone
policies); Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v. Morales: The
Intersection of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal Law, 39
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 101, 129 (2002) (same); see also Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d
484, 488 (6th Cir. 2002) (invalidating Cincinnati ordinance); State v. James, 978 P.2d 415
(Or. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting double-jeopardy challenge to Portland ordinance). On the
order-maintenance policing/zoning connection, see generally Ellickson, Controlling Chronic
Misconduct, supra note 7.
12. See, e.g., SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 4 (noting large volume of research on building
abandonment and vandalism); see also infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 49; see also, e.g., Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (invalidating Chicago's
Gang Congregation Ordinance as unconstitutionally vague).
15. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 13.3.2 (2001)
("The most basic form of zoning separates residential, commercial, agricultural, and
[Vol. 57:1
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City officials schooled in this ideology may naturally tend to equate ordered
land uses with the absence of disorder. 16 They also may be wrong. As Jane
Jacobs observed many years ago, "There is a quality even meaner than outright
ugliness or disorder, and this meaner quality is the dishonest mask of pretended
order, achieved by ignoring or suppressing the real order that is struggling to
exist and to be served."' 17 In other words, as I have suggested elsewhere, when
property is over- or misregulated, property regulations may impede efforts to
restore a vibrant, healthy, and organic public order.18
This Article begins, in Part I, with an overview of the "order-maintenance
revolution" generally, and its connection with property regulation specifically.
This Part discusses ways that local governments employ the tools of property
regulation to suppress physical disorder (and the social disorders associated
with it), such as the aggressive use of regulatory inspections and public
nuisance lawsuits to eliminate harmful land uses1 9 This Part further
demonstrates that many city officials have long treated-and continue to
treat-order-construction regulations (i.e., zoning laws) as another convenient
weapon against the social disorders targeted by broken windows policies.
Part II examines whether this longstanding tendency to equate property
regulations' disorder-suppression and order-construction functions may prove
counterproductive. The focus on curbing disorder comes at the same time that
increasing numbers of land-use scholars, urban planners, and government
officials are coming to endorse the view that some of our urban problems stem
from land-use regulations demanding the wrong kind of "order."'20 That is, as
Jacobs warned, the apparent "disorder" of a busy city neighborhood frequently
makes it safer-and better-than a deserted, but "orderly," one. This Part
examines arguments that the prevailing system of land-use regulation-
zoning-may devastate city neighborhoods by stifling the entrepreneurial
energies of inner-city residents and precluding the diversity of uses needed for
a healthy street life. It concludes with a case study of zoning in New York's
East Harlem, where efforts to use land-use reform to revitalize a struggling
community are underway.
2 1
industrial uses. Often called Euclidean zoning... such zoning is relatively rigid, focusing on
separation of different uses.").
16. See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
17. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 15 (1961).
18. Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and the Home-
Business Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191(2001) [hereinafter Garnett, On Castles].
19. See infra notes 63-93 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
21. See MANHATTAN CMTY. BD. #11, NEw DIRECTIONS: A 197-A PLAN FOR
MANHATTAN COMMUNITY DISTRICT #11 (1999), http://www.east-harlem.com/
ebl 1_197A index.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS]; N.Y.
City Dep't of City Planning, East Harlem Rezoning Proposal-Approved: Public Review
Process (2002), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/eastharlem/eastharlem4.html (last visited
Sept. 26, 2004); see also infra notes 174-90 and accompanying text.
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Part III of this Article turns to an important question: what if the traditional
assumption that order-construction regulations serve to suppress disorder is
correct? The broken windows hypothesis rests on the assumption that
government efforts are needed to reinforce private norms of order. If a broken
window sends a social signal that the community does not care about prolierty
maintenance, fixing the broken window will send the opposite signal. The
community will begin to care about such things; windows will not remain
broken, and property conditions will improve. If loitering gang members signal
that a community does not--or cannot-address gang lawlessness, dispersing
congregations of gang members signals that gang activity will not be
tolerated. 22 The use of property regulations to suppress disorder, as discussed
in Part I, should theoretically serve a similar norm-enforcing function.
The claim underlying the regulatory reforms discussed in Part II of this
Article is a very different one-namely, that the development of the economic
and social climate necessary to make city neighborhoods healthy, vibrant
places can be hindered by property regulations imposing the wrong kind of
order. But city officials and residents weary of disorder may greet with
significant suspicion the claim that the familiar order constructed by zoning
laws is unrelated, or even harmful, to disorder-suppression efforts. These
understandable anxieties reinforce strong public-choice impediments to needed
legislative reform. The remainder of Part III discusses why overcoming such
residents' fears and politicians' resistance may offer the best hope for
struggling city neighborhoods.
Untangling the order-construction/disorder-suppression equation is no
small task. Thus, Part IV of this Article concludes with a practical suggestion
about how to implement meaningful land-use reforms despite significant
cultural and institutional resistance to them. Specifically, I suggest that local
officials foster neighborhood-level discussions of land-use reforms, perhaps in
the community-policing forums that have become central to the order-
maintenance agenda. These discussions are unlikely to lead to a radical
overhaul of the rules governing urban land uses. Indeed, the results may strike
those most convinced by the arguments set forth in Parts II and III of this
Article as frustrating baby steps. Nevertheless, the ground-level reality in most
cities-resistance to reform, diverse neighborhoods with equally diverse
regulatory tastes, and the risks of unexpected consequences-make the case for
neighborhood-by-neighborhood regulatory reform a strong one.
I. THE NEW POLICING AND PROPERTY REGULATION
As briefly outlined above, property regulations serve two overlapping
order-maintenance functions. First, some aim to suppress disorder. And,
22. See, e.g., Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 7, at 351; Kahan, Social Norms,
supra note 7, at 614-15.
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second, others order land uses in a particular way, namely by segregating them
from one another. This Part focuses on disorder suppression, the first function
of property regulation. I briefly review the current focus in urban policy on
curbing disorder, including property-related disorder, before discussing some
of the various ways that local officials now seek to employ property-regulation
tools to achieve these goals. While this Part is primarily descriptive, this
description sets the stage for a discussion in Part II of potential perils of order-
construction regulations.
A. The Order-Maintenance Revolution
For most of American history, vagrancy, public drunkenness, and related
laws served as the primary legal check on the constellation of problems now
thought of as urban "disorders." These laws empowered local officials to "keep
the peace" in a number of ways, including, importantly, by arresting
individuals thought to breach it.23 After their establishment in the latter half of
the nineteenth century, municipal police forces became the primary regulators
of public order, and vagrancy-type laws their primary legal enforcement
mechanism. 24 Indeed, prior to the "constitutional revolution" of the late 1960s,
the majority of arrests made were for nonviolent "victimless" public-order
offenses: in 1960, more than half of all arrests were for vagrancy, public
drunkenness, or disorderly conduct; even as late as 1969, one in four arrests
was for public drunkenness. 25
Much has been said about the enforcement of legal sanctions against
disorderly behavior by police officers; from this vast literature, several
important themes emerge. First, arrests were not the primary means used by
police officers to "keep the peace." As James Q. Wilson described in his
classic, Varieties of Police Behavior, "To the patrolman, the law is one
resource among many that he may use to deal with disorder, but it is not the
only or even the most important : ...he approaches incidents that threaten
order not in terms of enforcing the law but in terms of 'handling the
situation. "'26 Most of the time, officers likely chose to "handle the situation"
informally, by, for example, telling brawling drunks to "break it up," asking
surly teenagers to move along, etc. 27
23. See, e.g., Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 595 (noting that, before
the constitutional procedure reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, police were given broad
authority to keep order and that "[m]ost states had loitering, drunk and disorderly, and
vagrancy statutes" to aid them in this task).
24. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 7, at 1200-01.
25. HOWARD M. BAHR, SKID Row: AN INTRODUCTION TO DISAFFILIATION 227 (1974).
26. JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 31 (1968) (emphasis in
original).
27. Many excellent examples of this informal police-public interaction can be found in
id. and in Egon Bittner's classic study, The Police on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping,
32 AM. Soc. REV. 699 (1967).
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Second, the police had vast discretion to decide when to arrest an
individual for a breach of the peace, 2 8 and the available legal sanctions
provided an important "backup" to these informal order-maintenance efforts.
29
As Wilson and Kelling observed in their Broken Windows essay,
Until quite recently . . . the police made arrests on such charges as
"suspicious person" or "vagrancy" or "public drunkenness"--charges with
scarcely any legal meaning. These charges exist not because society wants
judges to punish vagrants or drunks but because it wants an officer to have
the legal tools to remove undesirable persons from a neighborhood when
informal efforts to preserve order in the streets have failed.
30
Egon Bittner's famous study of the police on skid row, for example, noted the
"restricted relevance of culpability": many individuals encountered by a patrol
officer likely were technically guilty of a public-order offense; arrests occurred
only when an officer decided to remove the "person whose presence [was]
most likely to perpetuate the troublesome development.
'3 1
Finally, enforcement of public-order laws, and undoubtedly police order-
maintenance efforts generally, did not always conform to contemporary ideas
of "justice." Even strong proponents of order-maintenance policing
acknowledge this ugly history. 32 For example, Robert Ellickson acknowledges
that public-order laws "had long been disproportionately enforced against poor
people and members of racial minorities. In the mid-1960s, many police
departments were lily-white and heavily staffed with officers who were
insensitive, and sometimes brutal, in handling vagrants and arresting non-white
28. See, e.g., Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 595 (noting that vagrancy-
related statutes had "the effect ... of conferring a remarkable amount of discretion on the
local police" and that "[miany citizens were rendered almost perpetually subject to arrest
pursuant to catchall vagrancy laws"); William J. Stuntz, Crime Talk and Law Talk, 23 REVS.
AM. HIST. 153, 157 (1995) ("Prior to the 1960s, vagrancy and loitering laws made it possible
for police to arrest pretty much anyone, or at least anyone on the street: the laws were so
broad as to plausibly cover anything anyone might do in public."). Important early
examinations of the discretion problem include Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to
Invoke the Criminal Process, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960) and Wayne LaFave, The Police and
Nonenforcement of the Law-Part !, 1962 Wis. L. REV. 104.
29. See, e.g., Bittner, supra note 27, at 703 (describing how police used threat of law
enforcement to back up nonlegal order-maintenance action); Harcourt, supra note 9, at 344
(alleging that "[tihe order-maintenance strategy also depends on arresting people on
meaningless charges," and that "[w]hat makes the system work is the availability of broad
criminal laws that allow the police to take someone off the streets because they look
suspicious").
30. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 3, at 35.
31. Bittner, supra note 27, at 709, 713.
32. See Kahan & Meares, Coming Crisis, supra note 9, at 1159-71; Tracey L. Meares
& Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox of Unwanted Rights, in URGENT
TIMES 1, 3-30 (Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan eds., 1999) [hereinafter Meares & Kahan,
Paradox]; see also, e.g., Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 647 (arguing that
vagueness doctrine should play a more limited role with respect to the new generation of
order-maintenance laws).
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arrestees. ''33 Wilson's 1968 study of police behavior confirms how patrol
officers' stereotypes and suspicion of "outsiders" resulted in racial
discrimination, at times leading to underenforcement of public-order laws
against minorities and at other times leading to overenforcement.
34
In 1956, Caleb Foote's critique of Philadelphia's public-order enforcement
regime presaged the radical deregulation of our urban public spaces.35 After
observing hundreds of criminal vagrancy proceedings in Philadelphia, Foote
cited a magistrate who condemned vagrancy laws as the "garbage pail of the
criminal law."'36 Foote concluded that the only possible justification for this
system-the fact that "its flexibility gives the police a residual discretionary
power to control suspicious persons"-was an "illusory" one that permitted the
"substitution of harassment for the more difficult job of obtaining the evidence
necessary to convict criminals . . . [and] encourage[d] superficial and
inefficient police work."'37 Foote's influential article could only have been
welcomed by the police reformers who, for half of a century, had argued that
patrol officers' entanglements "on the beat" with minor "victimless" crimes-
vice, public disorder, and vagrancy-served little purpose and spawned
corruption, unequal enforcement, and public resentment. 38 Within a decade,
Foote's skepticism of apparently standardless enforcement of vagrancy laws
was rendered moot, both by cases invalidating such laws on "vagueness"
grounds39  and by police reforms downplaying officers' traditional
peacekeeping and crime-prevention functions.40
The story of the rapid disillusionment with the latter reforms, which
transformed police officers from peacekeepers into crime-fighters and replaced
foot patrols with patrol cars backed up by an elite force of detectives, has been
ably told elsewhere. 41 In short, by the time the Broken Windows essay was
33. Ellickson, supra note 7, at 1209.
34. See WILSON, supra note 26, at 39-46 (discussing officers' tendency to view certain
groups of individuals as "troublemakers").
35. Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603
(1956).
36. Id. at631.
37. Id. at 648.
38. See KELLING & COLES, supra note 6, at 70 (discussing reform-era policing
strategies).
39. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 167 (1972) (citing
Foote).
40. See generally, e.g., KELLING & COLES, supra note 6, at 80-85; Livingston, Police
Discretion, supra note 5, at 565-73 (describing the transformation of the American police
function from public-order maintenance and social service provision to "crime-fighting");
Mark H. Moore & George L. Kelling, "To Serve and Protect": Learning from Police
History, PUB. INT., Winter 1983, at 49 (arguing that the modem police force's "goal is the
control of crime, not maintaining public order or providing constabulary services").
41. See, e.g., KELLfNG & COLES, supra note 6, at 85-89 (describing collapse of reform-
era policing strategies by the 1970s).
October 2004]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
published in 1982, rising crime rates 42-and fear of crime and urban
disorder 3-had laid the groundwork for new experimentation with "old-style"
order-restoration strategies. Thus, just as soon as one revolution in policing
philosophy had ended in triumph, another "quiet revolution" began to refocus
police efforts on maintaining order.44 And arguments favoring these strategies,
which emphasize the need to reinforce social norms that check disorder,
4 5
appear to have carried the day. While former New York City mayor Rudolph
Giuliani's aggressive "quality of life" campaign is perhaps the best-known
example, order-maintenance policies have won a place of respect in
government agencies throughout the country.
46
42. See, e.g., PAUL S. GROGAN & TONY PROSCIO, COMEBACK CITIES 152 (2000) ("Out-
of-control crime was the nearly universal expectation for the inner city. Any other positive
trend there . . . was sharply hemmed in by the prospect of continued crime and, just as
important, an all-but-unshakable fear of crime."); Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note
5, at 568 (noting that crime rates rose dramatically during the 1960s and 1970s, and then
stubbornly remained at these unprecedented levels despite increases in police expenditures).
43. By the end of the 1980s, many of those who could do so simply chose to avoid
urban public spaces. See, e.g., KELLING & COLES, supra note 6, at 40-60. During this time, I
remember being told by my grandmother not to take my purse to downtown Kansas City,
Missouri. She was quite certain that it would be snatched away immediately.
44. See HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 13 (1990); George L.
Kelling, Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution, in PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING, at 1
(Nat'l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report Series No. 1, 1988); see also KELLING &
COLES, supra note 6, at 102-07 ("We must move away from the use of reactive, 911 policing
and return to a model of policing in which basic strategies are aimed at crime prevention and
order maintenance.").
45. For comprehensive treatments of the "social influence" justification for order-
maintenance policing, see, for example, Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 7. at 367-73.
The available empirical evidence weakly supports the crime/disorder connection. See POLICE
FOUND., NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT 122-24 (1981) (concluding that regular foot
patrols did not reduce crime but lowered citizens' fears of crime); SKOGAN, supra note 2
(connecting neighborhood disorder, crime, and urban decline); ROBERT TROJANOWICZ, AN
EVALUATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD FOOT PATROLS IN FLINT, MICHIGAN 85-87 (1982) (finding
that increased foot patrols reduced crime and resulted in a significant increase in citizen
satisfaction); Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 7, at 367-68 (linking New York's order-
maintenance policing to drop in crime rate); Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Consequences of
Compliance and Deterrence Models of Law Enforcement for the Exercise of Police
Discretion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1984, at 83 (positing a direct link between
crime and disorder); Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police
on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 163, 169, 176
(1988) (finding negative correlation between enforcement of disorderly conduct and drunk
driving laws). But see Harcourt, supra note 9, at 300-09 (asserting that little social science
evidence supports broken windows theory of deterrence); Lawrence W. Sherman, Attacking
Crime: Police and Crime Control, in 15 MODERN POLICING, CRIME AND JUSTICE 159, 198-99
(Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992) (arguing that systematic enforcement of laws
against minor crimes may increase crime and harm community relations).
46. See, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE 212
(1986) (asserting that community policing is "the wave of the future"); Herman Goldstein,
Toward Community-Oriented Policing: Potential, Basic Requirements, and Threshold
Questions, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 6 (1987) (arguing that "[t]he direction of change in policing
has turned an important comer" toward problem-oriented, crime-prevention, and order-
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B. Property Regulation as Disorder Suppression
The "order-maintenance revolution" also has produced thousands of pages
of academic commentary, much of which focuses on the questions raised by
police efforts to curb disorder in public places. 4 7 This debate about the
appropriate scope of police authority,4 8 such as the continued viability of the
"vagueness" doctrine, is an important one. 49 But it fails to take sufficient
maintenance strategies); Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 577 ("Today,
hundreds of police departments across the country . . . are experimenting with both
community and problem-oriented policing."). A complete explication of the distinctions
between the myriad policies falling under the "order-maintenance" umbrella-community
policing, problem-oriented policing, quality-of-life policing, broken windows policing, zero
tolerance, etc.-is beyond the scope of this Article. For a description of some of the many
distinctive strategies, see, for example, Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 573-
91; see also Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90
CAL. L. REv. 1513, 1527-38 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan, Reciprocity] (describing order-
maintenance policing, church-police collaboration, and selective privatization).
47. See Kahan, Reciprocity, supra note 46, at 1527 (characterizing "strict enforcement
of 'public order' laws" as "the most famous, and most controversial, technique associated
with the New Community Policing"); Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 592
(noting that "the advent of the 'new policing' raises the question whether police can be
authorized, within constitutional constraints, to perform the order maintenance tasks that
communities might designate").
48. See Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 564 ("[W]hatever the future of
community policing itself, the new focus on problems of disorder.., will lead-as it already
has led-to more contention over the proper bounds of police authority."). Much of this
commentary has focused upon a central difficulty with this particular order-restoration
antidote-namely, that public "peace keepers" were historically armed with sweeping (and,
as Foote's article shockingly illustrated, essentially unreviewable) discretion to enforce
vague laws criminalizing breaches of the "public order," such as vagrancy, loitering, public
drunkenness, and curfew laws. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government
Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553, 560 (1992) (noting the "stunning
breadth" of "old-style loitering and vagrancy laws").
49. Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares, in particular, have argued that judicial
skepticism toward discretionary enforcement of loitering laws and other order-maintenance
devices is outdated. They observe that minority communities exercise increasing levels of
political power-and have used that power to promote an increased emphasis on order-
maintenance. See Kahan & Meares, Coming Crisis, supra note 9, at 1159-71; Meares &
Kahan, Paradox, supra note 32, at 3-30; see also, e.g., Randall Kennedy, The State,
Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1255, 1256
(1994) (arguing that "a misguided antagonism toward efforts to preserve public safety,"
leading to underpolicing of inner-city communities, is a substantial problem plaguing
African Americans); Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 647 (arguing that
vagueness doctrine should play a more limited role with respect to the new generation of
order-maintenance laws). But see, e.g., Margaret A. Burnham, Twice Victimized, in URGENT
TIMES, supra note 32, at 63-69; Cole, supra note 9, at 1061 (arguing that "the new discretion
scholars underestimate the continuing threat of racial discrimination in the administration of
criminal justice"); Alan M. Dershowitz, Rights and Interests, in URGENT TIMES, supra note
32, at 33-39; Harcourt, supra note 9, at 299 (citing statistics demonstrating that
disproportionate numbers of African Americans are arrested for vagrancy and suspicion);
Carol S. Steiker, More Wrong than Rights, in URGENT TIMES, supra note 32, at 49-57. The
Supreme Court has thus far refused to abandon its skepticism toward laws that grant the
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account of other weapons in the order-maintenance arsenal.
Importantly, the standard debate tends to disregard the ways in which
government choices about the uses of property also dramatically affect an
urban environment without raising the same constitutional concerns about
police discretion. Consider the following example from one of the nation's
most troubled cities: The city of Detroit has demolished more than twenty-eight
thousand houses since 1989. The city's popular young mayor, Kwame
Kilpatrick, campaigned on a promise to raze five thousand vacant and
dilapidated houses in his first year of office; he has since turned his sights on
some of the empty downtown skyscrapers. "This is where drug dealers stash
their drugs, this is where people stash guns, this is where girls get abused,"
explains Kilpatrick. 50 Other city leaders are similarly concerned about
abandoned property. In a survey of the two hundred most populous American
cities conducted several years ago by John Accordino and Gary T. Johnson,
sixty-nine percent of respondents rated abandoned property as a significant
problem for their cities. The number was even higher-ninety-five percent-
for northeastern cities.
5 1
It is hardly surprising that cities prioritize demolition. 52 Social scientists
have long considered abandoned or deteriorating property to be a signal of
serious neighborhood decline.53 Blighted properties contribute to a city's
economic problems by discouraging neighborhood investment, 54 depriving the
city of tax revenue, 55 lowering the market value of neighborhood property,
56
police broad discretion to define and control behaviors that may threaten the public peace.
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (invalidating Chicago's Gang
Congregation Ordinance on vagueness grounds).
50. See Jodi Wilgoren, Detroit Urban Renewal Without the Renewal, N.Y. TIMES, July
7, 2002, at A10. The authors of a recent study of the property abandonment problem echoed
Mayor Kirkpatrick by observing that "crooks, killers, and losers tend to infest areas with
dead buildings, like maggots on a carcass." John Accordino & Gary T. Johnson, Addressing
the Vacant and Abandoned Property Problem, 22 J. URB. AFF. 301, 303 (2000); see also
ROBERT W. BURCHELL & DAVID LISTOKEN, THE ADAPTIVE REUSE HANDBOOK: PROCEDURES
TO INVENTORY, CONTROL, MANAGE, AND REEMPLOY SURPLUS MUNICIPAL PROPERTIES 15
(1981) (observing that abandoned property serves as "a clubhouse for all of the deleterious
elements in the neighborhood").
51. See Accordino & Johnson, supra note 50, at 311.
52. See id. (describing demolition efforts); James L. Dunn, Jr., Bureaucracy and the
Bulldozer, GOVERNING MAG., July 1994, at 22 (same).
53. See Susan D. Greenbaum, Housing Abandonment in Inner-City Black
Neighborhoods: A Case Study of the Effects of the Dual Housing Market, in THE CULTURAL
MEANING OF URBAN SPACE 139, 140 (Robert Rotenberg & Gary McDonogh eds., 1993)
("Empty buildings, weedy lots, quantities of unsavory litter, and angry graffiti suggest
profound maladies.").
54. See Accordino & Johnson, supra note 50, at 303.
55. See id.; Benjamin P. Scafidi et al., An Economic Analysis of Housing
Abandonment, 7 J. HOUSING ECON. 287, 288 (1998).
56. See Accordino & Johnson, supra note 50, at 303; Greenbaum, supra note 53, at
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and increasing the cost of business and homeowner insurance. 57 Furthermore,
blight has a "multiplier" effect; deferred maintenance of one building reduces
the incentives for neighbors to continue upkeep efforts. 58 Abandoned and
deteriorating properties also lead to serious social problems, as Wilson and
Kelling tacitly acknowledged in the title of their article. 59 Wesley Skogan's
study of the crime-disorder connection found that inner-city residents
consistently cite physical decay as one of the most significant "disorders"
plaguing their communities, for obvious reasons.60 Abandoned buildings are
"magnets for crime," places that serve as criminals' hangouts or staging
areas. 6 1 (One study conducted in Austin, Texas found evidence of illegal
activities in eighty-three percent of unsecured abandoned buildings.
62)
1. Disorder suppression through regulatory inspections
Property regulations designed to suppress disorder by authorizing the
inspection of private property conditions provide leaders like Mayor Kilpatrick
with the legal tools to attack this blight. Not surprisingly, therefore, a number
of cities have stepped up regulatory inspections of private property in an effort
to address disorder related to property decline. The most ambitious of such
efforts are multiagency enforcement "sweeps" of struggling neighborhoods that
include property inspections among a range of disorder-suppression devices.
63
57. Accordino & Johnson, supra note 50, at 303.
58. See, e.g., Greenbaum, supra note 53, at 140-41; William Spelman, Abandoned
Buildings: Magnets for Crime?, 21 J. CRIM. JUST. 481, 481 (1993) (arguing that "processes
of social and physical decay feed on one another, setting distressed neighborhoods on a
downward spiral").
59. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 3, at 32 (observing that "[s]ocial psychologists
and police officers" generally "tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is
left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken") (emphasis added).
60. See SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 37; Accordino & Johnson, supra note 50, at 306
(finding that city administrators believe that abandoned property has a highly negative effect
on neighborhood vitality and crime prevention efforts).
61. See, e.g., Spelman, supra note 58, at 482.
62. Researchers found evidence of drug use (nineteen percent of buildings); sex and
prostitution (twenty percent); stolen property (eight percent); as well as vandalism
(approaching one hundred percent). Id. at 488-89. Thirty percent of the unsecured properties
had been used as youth "hangouts"; squatters were living in seven percent of the houses. Id.
Nor was crime confined to the abandoned properties themselves; police received 3.2 times as
many drug calls, and twice as many theft and violent crime calls from blocks with unsecured
buildings as from otherwise comparable blocks in the same neighborhood. Id. at 489.
63. See, e.g., Doug Caruso, Finance Chief Sounds Budget Alarm, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Aug. 19, 2000, at 1C (noting that Columbus, Ohio's mayor adopted a program of
"neighborhood code enforcement and maintenance sweeps"); Editorial, Improving Code
Enforcement, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 11, 2002, at A14 (discussing New Britain,
Connecticut's Multi-Agency Response to Community Hotspots ("MARCH") program); City
of Albuquerque, Residential Code Enforcement, at http://www.cabq.gov/planning/pages/
codenforce/rescode.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) (describing Albuquerque, New Mexico
code enforcement coordination with other city agencies); City of Phila. Dep't of Streets,
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For example, in May and June of 2003, Tampa, Florida's "Operation
Commitment" sent dozens of police officers, drug and prostitution counselors,
and property inspectors through the city's worst neighborhoods. One such
"sweep" netted seven felony arrests and 122 code violations. 64 Other recent
enforcement sweeps targeted crime-ridden neighborhoods in Atlanta, Houston,
Omaha, and San Antonio. In each case, local officials asserted an order-
maintenance justification for their actions. 6 5 Candidates in recent mayoral races
in Dallas, Detroit, and Indianapolis made election promises to step up
enforcement sweeps.
66
The housing and building inspectors included in these sweeps-and the
codes that they enforce6 7-are not well regarded. Inspectors have long been
Streets & Walkways Education and Enforcement Program, at http:l/www.phila.gov/streets/
sweep.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2003) (describing Philadelphia's "S.W.E.E.P." program);
Executive Office of Pub. Safety, Community Policing Program Overview, at http://
www.state.ma.us/ccj/cp.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) (describing Massachussetts's
funding of community policing efforts, including code enforcement); Fort Lauderdale Police
Dep't, Code Team, at http://ci.ftlaud.fl.us/police/codeteam.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2004)
(describing role of Fort Lauderdale, Florida "Code Team" effort).
64. Tamara Lush, East Tampa Crime Sweep Includes Counselors, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, May 13, 2003, at 6B.
65. See Erin Grace, Neighbors Hope to See Eyesores Go, OMAHA WORLD HERALD,
Apr. 30, 2003, at 1 B (sweeps "respond to resident concerns about litter, junk and overall
neighborhood appearance"); Jonathan Heller, Escondido Targets Housing Violations, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 3, 2001, at NI-I (describing a sweep of a neighborhood that has
fallen victim to the "broken window theory"); Joe Holley, Reclaiming Their Streets, SAN
ANTONIO ExPREss-NEWS, Feb. 25, 2001, at IA ("Once the 'worst neighborhood in the city,'
Indian Creek is becoming livable again .... ); Flori Meeks, City Targets Code Violators on
Long Point, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 18, 2000, at 1 ("Houston's neighborhood protection
division recorded 192 municipal code violations . . . when it conducted a sweep of the
properties along Long Point Road."); Michael Pearson, Raising Lowe Lane, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Nov. 3, 2002, at El (noting that "the upcoming sweeps are designed to arrest the
creeping degeneration that leads to crime").
66. See Editorial, Broken Windows Are a Clue to Livability, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan.
18, 2002, at A14 ("The best cure for the broken-window syndrome is a municipal
administration conscientiously enforcing zoning laws and safety, health and housing codes.
Fortunately for Indianapolis, Mayor Bart Peterson has made enforcement one of his top
priorities."); Cameron McWhirter, Archer Tries to Balance Budget and Re-Election,
DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 4, 2001, at 1A (noting that former Detroit mayor Dennis Archer
"outlined an aggressive citywide clean-up this spring that will include a week-long Clean
Sweep [and] increased code enforcement"); Colleen McCain Nelson, City Trains Sights on
Neighborhood Blight, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 6, 2002, at IA (noting that Dallas
mayor Laura Miller "proposed the idea of neighborhood sweeps during her campaign").
67. Technically, building codes deal prospectively with new construction (design,
materials, construction techniques, etc.). Codes governing the condition of premises after
construction are called, variously, "safety codes," "health codes," and "housing codes." See
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 530 (2d ed. 2000); H. Laurence
Ross, Housing Code Enforcement as Law in Action, 17 LAW & POL'Y 133, 134 (1995)
("Housing codes differ from building codes in that they are not primarily concerned with
structure and materials but rather with function and condition.").
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condemned as corrupt and ineffective. 6 8 The handful of available studies
conclude that code enforcement is spotty, complaint-driven, and arbitrary, and
also that inspectors are not up to their appointed tasks of combating urban
blight and guaranteeing minimal housing standards.69 Furthermore, a
substantial economic literature indicts building and housing codes for
contributing to the property-abandonment problem discussed above and for
reducing the stock of affordable housing.70 City regulators, however,
apparently do not share this dim view of their jobs. In Accordino and Johnson's
study discussed above, one hundred percent of the respondents listed code
enforcement as the best way to deal with property blight.
71
These regulators obviously have powerful incentives to overstate the
importance of their jobs.72 But, when housing codes are treated as only one of
the various weapons in the order-maintenance arsenal, some of the perceived
"weaknesses" of the code enforcement system begin to look like strengths. For
example, while it is true that inspection regimes are primarily complaint-driven
(and necessarily so, because many code violations are not visible from the
outside of a building 73), community-policing theory encourages citizen input
into law-enforcement efforts, especially to identify problems that government
68. See STEPHEN R. SEIDEL, HOUSING COSTS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS 88
(1978) (discussing reports documenting widespread corruption in New York City's Building
Department); see also JOHN A. GARDINER & THEODORE R. LYMAN, DECISIONS FOR SALE:
CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN LAND-USE AND BUILDING REGULATION (1978); PETER D.
SALINS & GERARD C.S. MILDNER, SCARCITY BY DESIGN: THE LEGACY OF NEW YORK CITY'S
HOUSING POLICIES 42 (1992) (discussing corruption in the administration of New York
City's housing code).
69. See Stephen J. Polaha, Housing Codes and the Prevention of Urban Blight-
Administrative and Enforcement Problems and Proposals, 17 VILL. L. REv. 490 (1972)
(questioning effectiveness of inspections); Sarah H. Ramsey & Fredrick Zolna, A Piece in
the Puzzle of Providing Adequate Housing: Court Effectiveness in Code Enforcement, 18
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 605 (1991); Ross, supra note 67; Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing
Communities: What Works?, in COMMUNITIES AND CRIME 343 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Michael
Tonry eds., 1986) (questioning effectiveness of inspections); Spelman, supra note 58, at 492
(noting that "most housing inspection agencies are driven by individual complaints" and that
"the need to handle complaints is so great that inspectors have no time to deal with
underlying causes or even with dangerous conditions that do not generate citizen
complaints").
70. See generally, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 470-74
(4th ed. 1992) (attributing shortage of affordable housing to housing codes); SEIDEL, supra
note 68, at 73-75, 77, 90; Eli M. Noam, The Interaction of Building Codes and Housing
Prices, 10 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS'N 394 (1983); Ramsey & Zolna, supra note
69, at 605-06 (reviewing literature); Peter D. Salins, Reviving New York City's Housing
Market, in HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK CITY 53, 54-55 (Michael
H. Schill ed., 1999) (blaming New York City's housing shortage in part on overly complex
building regulations); Michael Walden, The Effects of Housing Codes on Local Housing
Markets, 15 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS'N 13 (1987).
71. See Accordino & Johnson, supra note 50, at 309.
72. See id. (noting that most of the surveys were completed by building inspectors with
obvious incentives to exaggerate their effectiveness).
73. See Ross, supra note 67, at 141.
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officials may overlook. 74 More aggressive code enforcement fits neatly into
this "problem solving" approach to identifying and addressing disorder, and a
number of cities have incorporated it into community-policing efforts through
programs asking citizens to identify problem properties.
75
Previous code enforcement studies have also criticized the "thickness" of
the regulatory code book. Lawrence Ross observed, for example, "the
inspector's quandary is created by the fact that the housing code is both
voluminous and ideal."' 76 A housing inspector may see the "thickness" of the
code as a strength: it gives her the significant bargaining power that comes with
the authority to issue citations carrying significant fines at virtually any time.
77
Thus, inspections often represent the first step toward nuisance remediation.
78
Inspectors may encourage owners to make cosmetic improvements that
enhance a neighborhood's appearance and deter crime, 79 or in more serious
cases, may close a building that fails to pass inspection until it is code-
compliant. 80 When buildings are simply beyond repair-or the cost of
74. "Problem-oriented policing" strategies can be traced to the work of Herman
Goldstein, an early critic of reform-era policing. Goldstein argued that police should devote
more time to proactively identifying and addressing community problems. See GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 44, at 14. "Community policing" tactics incorporate Goldstein's problem-
oriented approach, but also stress the importance of close community-police partnerships.
See Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 575-76 (discussing distinctions between
"problem-oriented" and "community" policing); see also, e.g., KELLING & COLES, supra note
6, at 159 (arguing that "[c]ommunity policing also acknowledges the reliance of police on
citizens, in multiple senses: for authority to police neighborhoods, for information about the
nature of neighborhood problems, and for collaboration in solving problems").
75. For example, Phoenix residents are encouraged to call a twenty-four-hour hotline
to report code violations and vacant properties occupied by drug dealers, illegal aliens, or
prostitutes. See Dunn, supra note 52, at 22; see also Accordino & Johnson, supra note 50, at
310 (describing other similar efforts).
76. See Ross, supra note 67, at 141; see also ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 67, at 529
("A building code is a technical document with a level of difficulty that at times may rival
that of the Internal Revenue Code.").
77. For a colorful account of this dynamic in action, see Peter Perl, Building Inspector
with a Bulletproof Vest, WASH. POST MAG., June 27, 1999, at W08.
78. See Accordino & Johnson, supra note 50, at 307.
79. Accordino and Johnson found that a number of cities permit inspectors to levy
nuisance fines, but waive them if the owner promises to make such improvements. Id. Forty-
three percent of the cities in their survey also provide cosmetic improvements to vacant
buildings, such as lawn mowing, facade painting and hanging curtains, in an effort to make
these properties look occupied. The cost of these improvements is imposed as a lien on the
improved property. Id. at 309; see also Dunn, supra note 52, at 22 (discussing Baltimore's
"Building Blocks" program). Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania instituted a public shaming program
in 1997; inspectors post signs identifying the owners of the most dilapidated properties.
Accordino & Johnson, supra note 50, at 310.
80. See Flatford v. City of Monroe, 17 F.3d 162, 165 (6th Cir. 1994) (after finding
hazardous conditions, inspector evacuated building and posted condemnation notices);
Phillips v. Mezera, No. 00-C3348, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24879, at *11-12 (N.D. I11. Oct.
31, 2001) (noting that local ordinance permitted city to condemn property for housing code
violations without court order). While the Due Process Clause requires the government to
notify an owner before closing or demolishing buildings for code violations, courts have
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compliance too high-they can be demolished, sometimes with the "consent"
of a property owner desperate to avoid tens of thousands of dollars in ongoing
fines.
8 1
Furthermore, building closures resulting from aggressive inspections may
eliminate criminal "hangouts" and disperse concentrations of crime. 82 Even
using code violations as a pretext for removing troublemakers is likely to
escape review.83 For example, a few years ago, the city of San Bernadino,
California, conducted a series of housing code enforcement "sweeps" in a low-
income area. As the Ninth Circuit observed, the "sweeps were massive
undertakings, with city officials, police, firefighters, and housing code
inspectors descending on the area to inspect dozens of pre-selected
buildings." 84 Over a six-month period, the city closed and evicted the tenants
from ninety-five buildings. 85 The property owners sued, alleging that the city
generally upheld summary closure (and even demolition) in "emergency" situations. See
Flatford, 17 F.3d at 168 (finding that government officials were entitled to qualified
immunity from a due process claim arising out of summary closure of plaintiffs building
because inspector reasonably determined that an emergency situation existed); see also
Freeman v. City of Dallas, 186 F.3d 601, 606 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Because there were no
exigent circumstances, the warrantless seizure and destruction of plaintiff's property was
unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment."), overruled in part on other
grounds, 242 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Lawrence Ross's three-city study of code-
enforcement practices suggests that building closures are rare and that most code violations
are remedied through negotiation between inspectors and property owners. See Ross, supra
note 67, at 149-57. A more aggressive approach might be expected, however, if inspections
are considered part of a broader order-maintenance strategy.
81. When property owners do not consent to the demolition of nuisance properties, the
administrative or judicial procedures required to secure legal authority to demolish a
building can be time-consuming and costly. See Accordino & Johnson, supra note 50, at
309-11; Spelman, supra note 58, at 492. The postinspection procedure in Dallas, Texas,
where aggressive building code sweeps are frequent occurrences, illustrates the "nuisance
removal" function of inspections. When code violations are uncorrected following an
inspection, the inspector refers the matter to the Urban Rehabilitation Standards Board. The
Board, in turn, may hold a hearing to determine whether a building is an "urban nuisance,"
in which case the Board is empowered to take various remedial measures, including ordering
repairs, receivership, vacating of buildings, demolition, and civil penalties of up to two
thousand dollars per day against noncompliant property owners. See Freeman, 186 F.3d at
603 (citing DALLAS CITY CODE, ch. 27, art. II, § 27-8).
82. See Spelman, supra note 58, at 492-93. In an unguarded moment, a student of
mine-a former police officer in a large midwestem city-told me that officers in some
"marginal" precincts would enlist building inspectors to close down buildings inhabited by
drug dealers, gang members, and other "troublemakers." The police viewed the closures as a
way to prevent further neighborhood decline by forcing these individuals to find somewhere
else to live, hopefully outside of the community.
83. Even if it were illegal, of course, pretext would unquestionably be difficult to
prove. See, e.g., Phillips, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24879, at *8 (finding that plaintiff stated a
cause of action for discriminatory enforcement of housing codes and citing city manager's
alleged statement that plaintiff "rent[ed] to gangbangers ... [who] are selling drugs from
that house").
84. See Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
85. These closures placed the building owners in a "precarious position." They needed
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"trumped up" a building code emergency to force the eviction of tenants with
criminal records and gang affiliations. 86 A panel of the Ninth Circuit rejected
the plaintiffs' primary constitutional claim, 87 reasoning that even if the city
"faked" the emergency justifying the sweeps, the city's actions were not
arbitrary because "the reduction in crime by relocating criminals and reducing
urban blight bears a rational relation to the public health, safety and general
welfare."'88 A divided en banc court affirmed.
89
Finally, and importantly, inspectors conducting "regulatory" searches and
-seizures are governed by different Fourth Amendment standards than are police
officers enforcing the criminal law. An inspector need only demonstrate that
"reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area
inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling" in order to obtain
an "administrative" search warrant; warrantless inspections are permitted in
"emergency situations."90 As a result, building inspectors may be permitted to
go places that police officers could not.9 1 Once there, inspectors can
to repair the buildings to secure city permission to reopen them. But they alleged that the
code-violation notices were so vague as to be unhelpful and that the eviction of their tenants
deprived them of the income needed to conduct repairs. Furthermore, the clock was
ticking-the four-plex buildings were nonconforming uses in an area zoned for duplexes; the
properties would lose this preferred status if they remained vacant for more than 180 days.
Id. at 1314.
86. Id. at 1314-15.
87. Armendariz v. Penman, 31 F.3d 860, 867 (9th Cir. 1994).
88.. Id. at 867. The panel reached this conclusion over the vigorous dissent of Judge
Trott, who argued:
The action cannot be justified as a means to control crime. If criminals are living in the units,
the police should arrest them .... If crime ... is rampant, the police should put a stop to it.
The city cannot simply start throwing innocent people out of private property to reduce crime
in a troubled neighborhood. A contrary rule is simply unimaginable.
Id. at 872 (Trott, J., dissenting); cf Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395
(1926) (holding that property regulation violates substantive due process only when "clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare").
89. Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1313.
90. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967); see also Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 n.4 (1987) (articulating administrative reasonableness
standard for regulatory searches); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978)
(same). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.9 (3d ed. 2000)
(reviewing administrative inspections doctrine). The Supreme Court has further suggested
that "warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused." Camara, 387 U.S. at
539. The en banc Fifth Circuit has arguably gone further, holding that administrative
warrants are not required if the inspectors could have satisfied the "administrative
reasonableness" standard. See Freeman v. City of Dallas, 242 F.3d 642, 651 (5th Cir. 2001)
(finding that warrantless seizure of building did not violate the Fourth Amendment because
"evidence of municipal code violation had already been obtained" and administrative
warrant would provide no additional protection of property rights).
91. A decade ago, after a series of shootings in the notorious Robert Taylor Homes, the
Chicago Public Housing Authority instituted a policy of warrantless law enforcement
"sweeps" of twelve public housing buildings. The sweeps were triggered by certain
"preconditions," such as random gunfire or intimidation at gunpoint. During the sweeps,
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accomplish goals that the Supreme Court has suggested that police officers
sometimes may not, i.e., forcing individuals viewed as threats to the public
order to "move along." 92 Furthermore, inspectors during code enforcement
"sweeps" are often accompanied by police officers, purportedly for the
inspectors' protection. Once lawfully present inside a building, the officers may
then seize evidence in "plain view," arrest individuals on outstanding warrants,
or perhaps catch them committing crimes during the inspection.
9 3
Housing Authority police searched all of the residential units in the targeted buildings for
weapons. A federal district court subsequently invalidated the sweep policy as inconsistent
with the Fourth Amendment, finding that the Authority failed to establish the exigency
necessary to overcome the warrant requirement. See Pratt v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp.
792 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (invalidating sweeps as inconsistent with Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement); see also Vincent Lane, Public Housing Sweep Stakes: My Battle with the
ACLU, 69 POL'Y REv. 68 (1994) (describing sweeps and events leading up to them). The
court left undisturbed, however, a consent decree that permitted the Authority to inspect
units for health and safety violations. See Herring v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 850 F. Supp. 694, 696
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting that in "Summeries v. Chicago Housing Authority, No. 88-C-10566
(N.D. Ill.) . . . [t]he district court eventually entered a Consent Decree ... [that] permitted
the CHA to conduct inspections to identify and remove unauthorized occupants and to
inspect the condition of the housing units, subject to the CHA's minimizing its intrusion on
the rights of its residents"). Those inspections, as described by the Chicago Housing
Authority chairman, accomplished many of the same goals as the police sweeps: "We sent in
a team of people to identify physical deficiencies in each unit .... Very often, during that
process, they ran across drugs, contraband, weapons, and other illegal items." See Lane,
supra, at 69.
92. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (invalidating Chicago's
Gang Congregation Ordinance, which authorized police to order loitering gang members to
"disperse and remove themselves from the area"). This use of "regulatory" inspections to
accomplish law enforcement goals illustrates an irony in the Court's Fourth Amendment
canon. The regulatory inspections doctrine rests on the presumption that investigatory
searches intrude more on privacy interests than regulatory ones. William Stuntz has
observed, "The regulatory state does not usually snoop around in people's bedrooms, and the
privacy content of what police can find there is plausibly distinguishable from the kinds of
information the state seeks for regulatory purposes." William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem
and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1016, 1061 (1995). But see Stephen J.
Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989 SuP. CT.
REv. 87, 89 (1989) (arguing that diminished privacy interests do not support administrative
search doctrine). But the Chicago Housing Authority acting as the regulatory state did snoop
in people's bedrooms. According to Authority Chairman Lane, the inspectors "looked under
beds to see if the tiles were loose [and] ... in the closets to make sure there were no leaks."
Lane, supra note 91, at 69.
93. While regulatory "sweeps" may tempt police officers to use the inspectors to gain
access to places and information that would otherwise be off limits, see, for example, Jones
v. City of Youngstown, 980 F. Supp. 908, 916 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that
police/inspector cooperation suggested that "inspections were a pretext for conducting
warrantless searches for drugs without probable cause"), the reasons for police to be present
during a sweep are usually more complex than simple bad-faith collusion. The multiagency
cooperation encouraged by community policing strategies often places police officers in
what Professor Debra Livingston has called their "community caretaking" role. See Debra
Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 261 (1998). When inspectors descend upon a dangerous neighborhood to conduct a
"sweep," it is likely true that they need police protection and also that the police can
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2. Disorder suppression through property litigation
State and local governments also are seeking to tackle the problems
associated with abandoned and neglected property through "public nuisance"
lawsuits. The public nuisance cause of action, which enables a court to award
equitable relief for "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public," has proven to be a remarkably flexible one. 94 A number of
cities have established public nuisance task forces which solicit citizen input
about property problems, dedicated one or more prosecutors solely to public
nuisance cases, and even created "problem properties courts."9 5 Publicly
prosecuted nuisance suits frequently target properties that are used for criminal
activities, particularly drug trafficking or prostitution;9 6 many proceed after
code enforcement efforts fail.9 7 Some cities have also taken steps to encourage
community groups to privately prosecute public nuisance actions, a few going
so far as to eliminate legislatively the primary obstacle to these private
prosecutions, namely, the standing requirement that a private individual suffer
a "special injury," distinct from the public's injury, to seek injunctive relief
"piggyback" on an inspection to conduct law enforcement functions that they might
otherwise be unable to perform. In such a situation, the Fourth Amendment likely has little
to say about their presence. Even if the "administrative" motive for an inspection is purely
pretextual, the Court has stated that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996). Furthermore, the Court has upheld warrantless inspections of junkyards for stolen
goods-despite the fact that the "inspections" were conducted by police officers searching
for evidence of criminal conduct. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). In rejecting a
Fourth Amendment claim in that case, the Court observed that "a State can address a major
social problem both by way of an administrative scheme and through penal sanctions." Id. at
712 (emphasis in original).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
95. See, e.g., Armandariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc);
City of Fort Collins, Public Nuisance Ordinance, at http://fcgov.com/cityattorney/
public-nuisance.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) (providing information about Fort Collins,
Colorado's "public nuisance" hotline); City of Fremont, Report a Hazard/Nuisance, at http://
www.ci.fremont.ca.us/PublicSafety/ReportAHazard/default.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004);
Press Release, Mayor Slay's Neighborhood Life Initiatives (Apr. 23, 2002), at http://
stlcin.missouri.org/release/getpressdetails.cfmn?Auto=387 (last visited Sept. 26, 2004)
(describing St. Louis, Missouri's "Problem Properties and Public Nuisance Crime Strike
Force" and creation of "Problem Properties Court").
96. See Div. of Criminal Justice, State of Conn., Nuisance Abatement Unit, http://
www.csao.state.ct.us/What%20We%20Do/nuisance.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
97. See, e.g., City of San Diego, Code Enforcement Unit, at http://genesis.sannet.gov/
infospc/templates/attorney/code-enforcement'jsp (last visited June 13, 2004). Connecticut's
Multi-Agency Response to Community Hotspots, or M.A.R.C.H., Program illustrates a
coordinated, community-policing approach to the nuisance problem. Through M.A.R.C.H.,
residents may "alert their Community Policing Officers to nuisance properties"; the police
department uses this information to prepare a list of problem properties. Nuisance
Abatement prosecutors then "assemble a team of ... inspectors" to inspect the property; if
the property owners fail to respond, prosecutors may pursue a nuisance action in housing
court. See Div. of Criminal Justice, State of Conn., supra note 96.
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against a public nuisance. 9 8
C. Order Construction as Disorder Suppression
But the property regulations at local governments' disposal do not simply
target disorderly property conditions. On the contrary, for the better part of the
past century, our dominant form of property regulation-Euclidean zoning-
has addressed the spatial separation of different land uses rather than property
conditions. That is, the point of ubiquitous zoning laws is to put "everything in
its place," to segregate economic from noneconomic activities, rich from poor,
etc.99
Reasoning from first principles, there is no particular reason to equate the
two functions of property regulation-disorder suppression and order
construction. That is, the "order" imposed by American zoning laws is not
necessarily the same thing as the absence of the physical and social disorders
targeted by broken windows tactics like code enforcement and public nuisance
suits. For example, zoning laws might declare a nonconforming use, such as a
comer grocery store in an older residential neighborhood, a "disorder,"100 but
surely only a fool would equate the comer store with the open-air drug markets
or brazen gang intimidation that have come to epitomize urban chaos. Nor
would most city officials see the store, which likely provides a valuable service
to nearby residents, as the same kind of disorder as chronic street nuisances
such as aggressive panhandlers or the "squeegeemen" famously targeted by
Mayor Giuliani in New York City.' 0'
Nevertheless, urban policymakers have long seen order-construction
regulations as an important bulwark against social disorder. As Richard Chused
98. See, e.g., M.S. Enkoji, Californians Get Say in Cases Involving Those Convicted of
Nuisance Laws, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 29, 2002, 2002 WL 102376866. For a thorough
discussion of the "special injury" requirement, see Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v.
Episcopal Cmty. Servs., 712 P.2d 914 (Ariz. 1985) (enjoining soup kitchen as public
nuisance). Some cities, especially in California, have successfully enjoined gang-related
activity as a public nuisance. While these latter efforts have met with bitter criticism in
academic journals, courts have turned away constitutional challenges to the practice. See,
e.g., Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in
Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249 (1998) (discussing and criticizing anti-gang
nuisance actions); see also, e.g., Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 640
(suggesting that "[c]ivil injunctions may offer.., an option for dealing with some public
order problems, most notably the problems posed by gangs who have adopted particular
neighborhoods as their turf').
99. See CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN
AMERICA (1977); see also GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING 144 (1999) (discussing Perin and
city land-use policy).
100. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 694-96 (1973) (discussing
potential benefits of small grocery store in residential enclave).
101. See Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 7, at 1175-84
(discussing "chronic street nuisances").
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persuasively argued in a recent article, the Progressive-era proponents of
zoning were "positive environmentalists" who firmly believed that "changing
surroundings would change behavior." 10 2 In the zoning context, these beliefs
translated into the argument that carefully ordered land uses-the separation of
commercial and industrial establishments from residences and, importantly, the
segregation of single-family homes from all other uses-would curb the social
disorders plaguing crowded American cities. For example, in its amicus brief in
the landmark Euclid case, the National Conference on City Planning argued:
[T]he man who seeks . . . an orderly neighborhood . . . assum[es] that his
children are likely to grow mentally, physically and morally more healthful in
such a neighborhood than in a disorderly, noisy, slovenly, blighted and
slum-like district. This assumption is indubitably correct. The researches of
physicians and public health students have demonstrated the importance of
our physical environment as a factor in our physical health, mental sanity and
moral strength; and the records of hospitals and criminal courts amply support
these conclusions.... Disorderliness in the environment has as detrimental an
effect upon health and character as disorderliness within the house itself.
103
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the current focus on disorder suppression
reinforces this traditional view in the minds of many city officials. For
example, a number of cities include zoning violations among the "disorders"
targeted during code enforcement sweeps. 10 4
City officials' concerns about the legal vulnerability of order-maintenance
policing innovations make the use of order-construction regulations to suppress
disorder all the more attractive. In 1999, the Supreme Court invalidated a
Chicago law that authorized police officers to order congregations of gang
members to "disperse and remove themselves from the area." 10 5 Other cities'
efforts to limit aggressive panhandling, sleeping in public spaces, etc., also
102. Richard H. Chused, Euclid's Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 597,
601 (2001).
103. Brief of the National Conference on Ciiy Planning, the Ohio State Conference on
City Planning, the National Housing Association, and the Massachusetts Federation of Town
Planning Boards, at 29-30, Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (No.
31).
104. See, e.g., Melia Bowie, Crackdown a Sign of Hard Times, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
May 11, 2003, at 1; Business Violations Found in Sweep, BOSTON GLOBE, June 20, 2003, at
B2; Martin J. Chivez, Albuquerque Mayor Chvez Celebrates First Anniversary of
Community Enforcement and Abatement Task Force, U.S. MAYOR ARTICLES, Apr. 28, 2003,
http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/us-mayor-newspaper/documents/04 28_03/albuquerqueB
P.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2004); Dan Thanh Dang, A Battle Is Won, Another Starts, BALT.
SUN, May 30, 2000, at 1B; Lili LeGardeur, City Official Enjoys Cleaning Streets, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 24, 2000, at 4; Tish Osborne, 2nd Code Enforcement
Officer Helps City Crack Down on Zoning Scofflaws, TAMPA TRIB., June 9, 2002, at 2; John
F. Street, Philadelphia's Neighborhood Transformation Initiative: Restoring Vitality to the
City of Brotherly Love, U.S. MAYOR ARTICLES, Apr. 15, 2002, http://www.usmayors.org/
uscm/us..mayor.-newspaper/documents/04_15_O2/philadelphia.asp (last visited Sept. 26,
2004).
105. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (invalidating Chicago's Gang
Congregation Ordinance as unconstitutionally vague).
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have been invalidated-and sharply criticized as inhumane.10 6 Yet city
officials can proceed virtually assured that regulations ordering private land
uses will not be questioned by courts (and are far less likely to be challenged in
the court of public opinion). As a matter of federal constitutional law, it is well
established that nonconfiscatory land-use regulations are subject to rational
basis review-that is, they will be upheld if the court is satisfied that some
conceivable government interest justifies the governmental policy. 107 Indeed,
so great is the discretion afforded the government-qua-property-regulator that
Debra Livingston, a community-policing expert, cites regulatory measures (like
closing abandoned buildings) as evidence of the proposition that many order-
maintenance policies do not raise legal issues at all.
108
II. RETHINKING THE DISORDER-SUPPRESSION/ORDER-CONSTRUCTION
EQUATION
All of this suggests that efforts to seize upon the tools of property
regulation to curb the disorders targeted by order-maintenance policies will
106. See Loper v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993) (enjoining
enforcement of antibegging statute); Berkeley Cmty. Health Project v. City of Berkeley, 902
F. Supp. 1084, 1089-92 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (preliminarily enjoining Berkeley's antisolicitation
ordinance); Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (invalidating statute
prohibiting accosting for the purpose of begging), rev'd and remanded, 38 F.3d 1514 (9th
Cir. 1994); see also Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First
Amendment and the Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896 (1991); Fay Leoussis, The New
Constitutional Right to Beg-Is Begging Really Protected Speech?, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REV. 529 (1995); Cynthia R. Mabry, Brother Can You Spare Some Change-And Your
Privacy Too?: Avoiding a Fatal Collision Between Public Interests and the Beggar's First
Amendment Rights, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 309 (1994); Jonathan Mallamud, Begging and the
First Amendment, 46 S.C. L. REV. 215 (1995); Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and
the Homeless: Are the Homeless Constitutional Castaways?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255
(1994).
107. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding early
zoning law); see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem,
71 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 934, 941 (2003) (discussing standard of review); Molly S. McUsic,
Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. REV.
591, 602 (1998) (same); Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1607
(1988) (same). Theoretically, a property owner has the right to challenge a property
regulation as an "inverse condemnation" or "regulatory taking" requiring monetary
compensation, but actions resulting in less than a total deprivation of all economic value are
subject to ad hoc judicial review that strongly favors the government. See Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (finding that regulation resulting in total deprivation
of all economic value constituted categorical taking). But see Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330-32 (2002) (finding that
"temporary" taking of all value for thirty-two months was subject to ad hoc review); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (articulating multifactor balancing
test for nontotal takings). See generally DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY:
TAKINGS 121-22 (2002) (discussing ad hoc takings analysis).
108. See Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 584 (discussing building
closures and other "ameliorative measures" and asserting that "[s]uch measures.., raise few
issues within the traditional scope of legal scholars' concerns").
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continue. The evidence linking abandoned and dilapidated property to crime
and disorder and, importantly, the relative lack of judicial oversight of the
government-qua-property-regulator makes property regulations all the more
attractive to policymakers. But this discretion places the onus on political
actors to examine critically how property regulations affect efforts to restore
order, and life, to urban communities. Herein lies a danger: city officials who
reflexively view property regulation as a convenient weapon against disorder
may tend to discount the significant economic and social costs that such a
policy imposes.
Consider, for example, the range of explanations offered for the property
"blight" problem discussed above. Along with racial dynamics, suburban
sprawl, urban disinvestment,, housing "filtering," and high property taxes,
109
economists have indicted numerous government policies that aim to eliminate
blight. For example, housing and building codes are targeted as outdated and
overly burdensome,1 1 0 thus suggesting that the costs of regulatory sweeps may
ultimately outweigh their benefits.Ill Other government land-use policies,
especially a now-discredited urban renewal program1 12 and the construction of
109. See, e.g., E.M. BRIGHT, TAKING WITHOUT COMPENSATION IN LOW-INCOME AREAS:
TURNING TRAGEDY NTrO OPPORTUNITY (1995) (discussing taxes); BURCHELL & LISTOKEN,
supra note 50, at 15 (discussing sprawl); W. GRIGSBY ET AL., THE DYNAMICS OF
NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE AND DECLINE 48 (D. Diamond & J.B. McLoughlin eds., 1987)
(discussing race); D. MEYERS, HOUSING DEMOGRAPHY: LINKING DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE
AND HOUSING MARKETS (1990) (discussing sprawl); David Arsen, Property Tax Assessment
Rates and Residential Abandonment, 51 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 361 (1998) (discussing taxes);
Greenbaum, supra note 53, at 139-43 (discussing race and literature on "invasion-succession
model" of urban decline); Scafidi et al, supra note 55, at 290 (discussing taxes).
Interestingly, many cities continue to view the acquisition of properties through tax
foreclosures as an important antidote to the abandoned property problem. See Accordino &
Johnson, supra note 50, at 307; Dunn, supra note 52.
110. See, e.g., STEPHEN R. SEIDEL, HOUSING COSTS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
(1978); see also supra note 70.
111. Professor Michael Schill once commented to me that, in his view, housing code
sweeps were "homelessness creation programs."
112. See, e.g., BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: How
AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 16 (1985) (noting that planners believed that the existing cities
were obsolete and that "[t]o replace the obsolete city with this new vision would mean
tearing down much of what was there"); LEWIS MUMFORD, FROM THE GROUND UP 226-29
(1956) (arguing that clearance was the only solution to cities' problems); JOHN C. TEAFORD,
THE ROUGH ROAD TO RENAISSANCE: URBAN REVITALIZATION IN AMERICA 105 (1990)
(characterizing the "eradication of slums" as the "ultimate dream of planners"); Michael H.
Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 795, 808 (1991) ("The
numbers of jobs created and the amount of private sector investment generated by the
program were below hopes and expectations of its proponents . . . [and] the human toll
caused by displacement and the destabilization of nearby residential communities casts
doubt upon the efficacy of subsidized site assembly .... "). Sadly, in many places, urban
renewal likely made things worse. Bulldozers destroyed intact and fairly stable communities
and scattered residents to the winds to make way for buildings and housing projects that
most urban planners now consider to be completely antithetical to healthy community life.
And these were the successes. In many cities, renewal created little but rubble. As of 1965,
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limited access highways, 113 also backfired-as evidenced by the fact that
decades later, some government officials seek to tackle blight by undoing them.
For example, the federal "Hope VI" program provides funds to demolish
urban-renewal-era public housing projects and replace them with low-rise,
mixed-income projects built in the "new urbanist" style currently championed
by many planners. 114 Other cities are seeking to renew and reconnect
neighborhoods by tearing down elevated highways. 115
the Kosciusko Project in St. Louis, Southwest Temple Project in Philadelphia, and Camden
Industrial Park in Baltimore had been vacant since 1956, and the Ellicott District Project in
Buffalo and Lake Meadows Project in Chicago since 1952. Urban Renewal Wastelands:
Cities' Development Is Suffering as Bulldozed Acres Lie Idle and Untaxed, NATION'S Bus.,
Apr. 1965, at 86-87. Rubble-strewn wastelands in St. Louis and St. Paul earned such less-
than-affectionate nicknames as "Hiroshima Flats" and "Superhole." Roger Montgomery,
Improving the Design Process in Urban Renewal, in URBAN RENEWAL 454, 456-66 (James
Q. Wilson ed., 1966). Although most of the land condemned for urban renewal eventually
was developed, many cities' problems with vacant properties can be traced directly to the
program's failures. See, e.g., FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra, at 15-60. On urban renewal, see
generally, for example, FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra, at 15-38; CHARLES N. GLAAB & A.
THEODORE BROWN, A HISTORY OF URBAN AMERICA (3d ed. 1983); ZANE L. MILLER &
PATRICIA M. MELVIN, THE URBANIZATION OF MODERN AMERICA: A BRIEF HISTORY (1973);
TEAFORD, supra, note 113, at 44-80; URBAN RENEWAL, supra.
113. Large-scale freeways ripped through neighborhoods, forcibly uprooting thousands
of residents. Furthermore, because limited access highways eliminate cross-streets to
decrease congestion and delay, such roads inevitably divide and devastate previously intact
communities. Even elevated highways, which allow for underpasses, cast a deadly shadow
upon previously vibrant streets. For a poignant description of the destructive effects of one
freeway project, see, for example, ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES
AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 523-25 (1974) (describing the decline of Brooklyn's "Finn
Town" following construction of the Gowanus Parkway: "[T]he avenue was cast forever into
darkness and gloom, and its bustle and life were forever gone . . . . Moses' steel and
concrete, 'lifted into the air' above a neighborhood for the convenience of motorists driving
through the neighborhood to get somewhere else, had destroyed the neighborhood.").
114. On the myriad of problems (physical and social) plaguing public housing, see
Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go from Here?, 60 U. CHI. L.
REv. 497 (1993). On Hope VI, see generally U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., WHAT IS
HOPE VI?, at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/index.cfm (last visited
Sept. 26, 2004); Patrick E. Clancy & Leo Quigley, Hope VI: A Vital Toolfor Comprehensive
Neighborhood Revitalization, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 527 (2001); Michael S.
FitzPatrick, A Disaster in Every Generation: An Analysis of Hope VI: HUD's Newest Big
Budget Development Plan, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 421 (2000).
115. The best known example of such a project is Boston's mammoth Central
Artery/Tunnel Project, or "Big Dig," which will replace the city's elevated six-lane Central
Artery with an eight-to-ten-lane underground freeway-thus clearing the way for the
redevelopment of the land currently occupied by the freeway. See, e.g., DAN McNICHOL &
ANDY RYAN, THE BIG DIG (2000); PETER VANDERWARKER, THE BIG DIG: RESHAPING AN
AMERICAN CITY (2001); Boston Globe, Beyond the Big Dig, at http://www.boston.com/
beyondbigdig/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2004); Mass. Turnpike Auth., The Big Dig, at http://
www.bigdig.com (last visited Sept. 26, 2004). The project has been widely criticized for
delays and over a billion dollars in cost overruns. See, e.g., Raphael Lewis & Sean P.
Murphy, Artery Errors Cost over $IB, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2003, at Al. San Francisco
demolished the never-completed Embarcadero freeway after the structure was damaged in
the 1990 earthquake in an effort to give new life to a section of previously moribund
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Furthermore, the renewed emphasis on curbing disorder, including
property-related disorder, comes at the same time that many land-use scholars
and urban planners are of the view that the order-construction regulations may
contribute to urban decline. This view can be traced to Jane Jacobs's insight,
repeated quite often these days in law reviews, architectural magazines, and
planning journals, that people make city streets feel safe and vibrant.116 Thus
the law can help ensure healthy streets by fostering a diversity of land uses that
ensure people have reason to be on the street throughout the day and night. In
contrast, land-use policies that separate economic and noneconomic activities
may devastate city neighborhoods by precluding the diversity that gives them
life.
According to this view, our prevailing system of land-use regulation is an
urban villain. If the Jacobs critique is correct-and increasing numbers of
experts have come to endorse it-then city officials make a serious mistake
when they proceed on the traditional assumption that properly ordered land
uses suppress social disorder. Public nuisance suits and regulatory sweeps can
board up broken windows, but they cannot fill vacant lots and empty
storefronts. What's more, there are reasons to believe that order-construction
regulations may keep those lots and storefronts empty, and, consequently,
undercut disorder-suppression efforts themselves. The remainder of this Part
discusses two theoretical cases in which this may be so--the first made by
enterprise-zone enthusiasts in the early 1980s and the second by the new
urbanist planners who currently find themselves in vogue. It concludes with a
case study of an ongoing land-use reform effort in New York's East Harlem.
A. Fostering Economic Vitality Through Deregulation: Enterprise Zones
The assertion that overly burdensome regulations impede the social and
economic prospects of poor people has become standard fare in moderate-left
to libertarian-right circles. This claim is an attractive one-indeed, one that I
have endorsedl 17-both because it rings true (everyone has heard a red-tape
waterfront property. See, e.g., Robert Campbell, Bay Watch, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14, 2002,
at E l ("Boston planners can learn a lot from the good, bad, and ugly of San Francisco public
spaces[.]"). And Milwaukee has begun demolishing a number of elevated freeways that
divided and destroyed communities during the urban renewal period. See JOHN 0. NORQUIST,
THE WEALTH OF CITtES: REVITALIZING THE CENTERS OF AMERICAN LIFE 160-65 (1998);
MILWAUKEE DEP'T OF CITY DEV., PARK EAST REDEVELOPMENT PLAN, at http://
www.mkedcd.org/parkeast (last visited Sept. 26, 2004); Julie A. Penman, The Park East Is
Down. Now What?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 28, 2003, at J1.
116. See infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
117. See Garnett, On Castles, supra note 18, at 1216-19 (arguing that home business
regulations may impede welfare reform efforts); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Road from
Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation and the Urban Poor, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173,
217-28 (2001) [hereinafter Gamett, The Road from Welfare to Work] (advocating relaxation
of rules banning informal "jitney" van services).
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horror story 118) and because it suggests that government can renew our urban
cores and empower our poorest citizens simply by stepping aside. Perhaps the
most comprehensive case for a deregulatory urban policy was made in the early
1980s by proponents of so-called "enterprise zones." Enterprise zones have a
diverse intellectual pedigree, having been proposed by a socialist, almost
immediately championed by a luminary of the British Conservative Party, and
imported to the United States by a scholar at a conservative think tank. 119 The
idea originated with Peter Hall, a socialist professor of geography at Reading
University. 120 Hall returned from a visit to Asia in the late 1970s impressed
with the level of industry generated by the free market economies of Hong
Kong and Singapore and convinced that economic deregulation might work
similar miracles in Britain's depressed areas. 121 Hall therefore proposed that
Britain establish a limited number of "freeports": "[s]mall, selected areas of
inner cities would simply be thrown open to all kinds of initiatives, with
minimal control." 122 He described his policy as "an essay in non-plan,"'
123
based upon "fairly shameless free enterprise" where "bureaucracy would be
kept to the absolute minimum."
124
Soon after Hall unveiled his proposal in 1977, leading spokesmen of the
then-opposition British Conservative Party began to champion it.125 These
Conservatives outlined a bold plan for limited zones within which "the Queen's
writ shall not run." 126 Within these zones, planning laws and rent and wage
118. My favorite one is the tale of the "muffin lady"-Linda Fisher, a former welfare
recipient and single mother who sought to pull herself out of poverty by selling home-baked
muffins door-to-door. Fisher learned to her surprise that her home business was illegal for
various reasons (including a too-small oven). She was only able to return to baking after the
local volunteer fire department made its oven available to her. Katherine Shaver, For "The
Muffin Lady, " Some Home-Baked Troubles, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1997, at Al. Fisher's
initial misfortune ultimately turned out to be a blessing in disguise, as it led to appearances
on national television, a cookbook, and offers to franchise her business. Carole Sugarman,
Muffin Makeovers: Recipes and Reflections from Linda Fisher, Rebuilding Her Life One
Batch at a Time, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1998, at El.
119. Michael Allan Wolf, Enterprise Zones: A Decade of Diversity, 4 ECON. DEV. Q. 3,
4(1990).
120. STUART M. BUTLER, ENTERPRISE ZONES: GREENLINING THE INNER CITIES 2 (1981).
121. See Wolf, supra note 119, at 4.
122. See Peter Hall, The British Enterprise Zones, in ENTERPRISE ZONES: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 179, 180 (Roy Green ed., 1991) [hereinafter
ENTERPRISE ZONES] (quoting PETER HALL, GREEN FIELDS AND GREY AREAS (Papers of the
RTPI Annual Conference, Chester, 1977)).
123. See BUTLER, supra note 120, at 96 (quoting Hall). Hall's reference to "nonplan"
refers to a 1969 article, Peter Hall et al., Nonplan: An Experiment in Freedom, 26 NEW
SOC'Y 435-43 (1968). See Hall, supra note 122, at 179.
124. Id.; see also BUTLER, supra note 120, at 97 (describing the details of the
"Freeport" proposal, which included no customs regulations or wage or price limitations, a
drastic reduction in taxes, and limited social services).
125. BUTLER, supra note 120, at 95, 98-102.
126. Id. at 99 (quoting Sir Keith Joseph, Chief Spokesman on Industrial Matters for the
Conservative Party).
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controls would be virtually eliminated (save for basic health and safety
standards), local and national governments would be required to sell all of the
land that they owned, entrepreneurs would enjoy significant tax relief, and,
finally, government subsidies would be eliminated. 127 When the Conservatives
swept into power in 1979, the strong British parliamentary system enabled the
new leadership to establish a watered-down version of these enterprise zones
with little trouble. 12
8
The enterprise-zone idea soon struck the fancy of American economist
Stuart Butler, who used his post at the conservative Heritage Foundation to
spread the free market gospel on this side of the Atlantic. 129 Butler's case for
enterprise zones relied heavily on the works of Jane Jacobs and David Birch.
From Jacobs, Butler drew the idea of the successful urban neighborhood as an
organic entity bound together by complex social relationships. 130 From Birch,
an MIT economist, he found support for his claim that small businesses would
fuel any successful renewal effort. 131 The goal of enterprise zones, Butler
asserted, was "[t]he creation of employment for inner city residents" generally
and a new entrepreneurial class of residents in particular. 132 To accomplish this
goal, Butler argued, the federal government should offer federal tax relief in
exchange for sweeping property deregulation by state and local
governments. 1
33
Butler's indictment of the regulatory status quo was a sweeping one, but he
singled out zoning rules as "very costly in social and employment terms."'
1 34
He argued that zoning harms poor communities in two ways. First, zoning laws
preclude mixed-use patterns of development that are "an essential element in
the[] stability and vitality" of poor neighborhoods; and second, they impose
unnecessary compliance costs on small businesses and providers of low-cost
housing. 135 In asserting that the elimination of zoning laws could fuel inner-
city renewal, Butler relied upon Bernard Siegan's study of land-use patterns in
Houston, Texas-the only large U.S. city without zoning laws. Siegan argued
that the lack of zoning in Houston helped to create an entrepreneurial class in
low-income neighborhoods. Siegan quoted, for example, Houston's planning
127. Id. at 102 (describing the proposal of Sir Geoffrey Howe, M.P., who was to
become Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Thatcher government).
128. Within a year of its ascendancy, the Thatcher government set up six five-hundred-
acre zones within which businesses enjoyed a reduced tax burden and relatively minor
(compared to the early proposals) relaxation of local regulations governing land use. See
BUTLER, supra note 120, at 103; David Boeck, The Enterprise Zone Debate, 16 URB. LAW.
71, 76 (1984).
129. Wolf, supra note 119, at 5.
130. BUTLER, SUpra note 120, at 32.
131. Id. at 66-67.
132. See id. at 139.
133. Id. at 143-50, 155-56.
134. Id. at 54.
135. Id. at 54-56.
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director for the proposition that
The mixed land use pattern that is found in some sections of the city [because
of the absence of zoning] should, therefore, not be viewed as bad. In a lower
income area, the availability of car-repair services, eating establishments, bars
and such service outlets makes for an "attractive" neighborhood in the sense
of convenience for a group that has low mobility. The ability to establish a
business in one's garage or home contributes to easy entry of individuals into
the economic system.
136
The idea implicit in this statement-that zoning rules would impede low-
income individuals' efforts to start businesses-was therefore at the heart of
the original enterprise-zone proposal.
Although the idea garnered early bipartisan support, 137 and the strong
endorsement of President Ronald Reagan (who made enterprise zones the
centerpiece of his urban agenda), 138 enterprise zones did not become a part of
federal policy until Congress enacted the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise
Communities Act in 1993.139 Despite federal legislative inaction (or perhaps
because of it) state and local governments quickly seized upon the idea, and,
within a decade, established literally hundreds of enterprise zones across the
nation. 140 Along the way, however, the deregulatory aspects of the early
enterprise zones fell by the wayside. Although both the Reagan administration
and model legislation circulated by the American Legislative Exchange
Council recommended that state and local governments minimize regulatory
barriers to low-income entrepreneurs, including price and rent controls,
minimum-wage provisions, and zoning and building codes, 14 1 these reforms
136. Id. at 56.
137. The enterprise zone quickly found a champion in then-Representative Jack Kemp,
who, together with Representative Robert Garcia of the South Bronx, introduced legislation
early in 1980 that would have implemented many of the fiscal incentive aspects of Butler's
proposal. Id. at 132-33; Wolf, supra note 119, at 5.
138. See generally BUTLER, supra note 120, at 138 (noting that candidate Reagan made
clear that the enterprise zone would be crucial to his urban policy); Boeck, supra note 128
(including a complete description of early federal legislative proposals).
139. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1397D
(1993), amended by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 951-52, 111 Stat.
788, 885 (1997).
140. Wolf, supra note 119, at 5; see also Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal
Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 509 (1997) (noting that enterprise
zone laws were enacted by three-quarters of the states in the 1980s, leading to creation of at
least five hundred zones). Additionally, hundreds (probably thousands) of other development
incentives dot the land, the result of a rapidly proliferating "economic war" among state and
local governments seeking to lure businesses away from their existing locations. See, e.g.,
KENNETH P. THOMAS, COMPETING FOR CAPITAL 159 (2000) (estimating that total state and
local government tax incentives and subsidies exceed $50 billion annually); Peter D. Enrich,
Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives
for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 382-89 (1997) (describing common tax incentives);
Clayton P. Gillette, The Law and Economics of Federalism: Business Incentives, Interstate
Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447,479 (1997) (same).
141. See 7 AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, THE SOURCE BOOK OF
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were rarely enacted into law.14 2 Instead, state and local-and, until very
recently, federal-efforts have concentrated almost exclusively on providing
fiscal incentives to locate new businesses within enterprise zones. 143 Examples
of regulatory relief are rare and tend to be procedural in nature, such as efforts
to manage or reduce red tape by streamlining permit application processes at
"one-stop permit shops" or establishing a "regulatory ombudsman" to field
questions from frustrated applicants.
144
Similarly, the federal "Empowerment Zone" legislation ultimately enacted
in 1993 contains no regulatory concessions, but instead relies upon a
combination of tax incentives and government subsidies to spur investment in
inner cities. Each of the lucky "Empowerment Zone" and "Enterprise
Community" designees receives a sizable federal grant 14 5 and qualifies for
roughly a dozen different federal tax breaks. 146 It was not until the creation of
federal "Renewal Communities" in 2001 that Congress incorporated
deregulation into an enterprise-zone-type policy. The federal law creates forty
geographically based Renewal Communities within which significant federal
tax incentives are available. To qualify for these incentives, state and local
governments must agree to waive or reduce at least four of the following
regulations-occupational licensing requirements, zoning restrictions on home-
based businesses, zoning restrictions on child-care centers or schools, permit
requirements for street vendors, and franchises or other restrictions on
AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATION: CHILDREN, FAMILY, NEIGHBORHOOD, COMMUNITY: AN
EMPOWERMENT AGENDA 74-83 (1991); Boeck, supra note 128, at 139-43 (describing the
Reagan administration's support for regulatory reform at the state and local level).
142. See Wolf, supra note 119, at 5; see also Briffault, supra note 140, at 510 (2000)
(noting that "regulatory relief is now a minimal component of enterprise zone programs");
Franklin J. James, The Evaluation of Enterprise Zone Programs, in ENTERPRISE ZONES,
supra note 122, at 225, 232 (claiming that "the concept of extensive deregulation as a
development incentive is defunct and indefensible").
143. See Wolf, supra note 119, at 5-6 (finding that tax incentives-including property
tax reductions or exemptions, sales tax concessions, and employment tax credits for hiring
certain targeted employees-form the backbone of most enterprise zone policies).
144. See Rodney A. Erickson & Susan W. Friedman, Comparative Dimensions of State
Enterprise Zone Policies, in ENTERPRISE ZONES, supra note 122, at 155, 164 (finding that
"very little regulatory relief was being granted by the states" and that "the regulatory relief
that has been offered tends to be procedural rather than substantive, and is usually in the
form of one-stop permits, fast-tracking, and fee reductions"); James, supra note 142, at 232
(noting that "some state programs have called for streamlined regulatory processes as an
incentive for business investment").
145. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1397f(a)(2)(B) (2000) (appropriating Social Security Block
Grant funds for Round I empowerment zone/enterprise community designees).
146. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., TAX INCENTIVE GUIDE FOR BUSINESSES
IN THE RENEWAL COMMUNITIES, EMPOWERMENT ZONES, AND ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES
(2001), available at http://www.cdvca.org/pdf/incentive.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2004)
(listing tax incentives, including Empowerment Zone Employment Credit, Work
Opportunity Tax Credit, Welfare-to-Work Credit, and Tax Exempt Facilities Bonds); see
also 26 U.S.C. § 1394 (2000) (tax-exempt facility bonds); id. § 1396 (Empowerment Zone
Employment Credit).
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competition. for businesses providing public services, including taxicabs,
jitneys, cable television, or trash hauling.
147
Even considering the regulatory relief mandated by this new federal policy,
however, the enterprise-zone concept has strayed far from its laissez faire roots.
Indeed, the progeny of Butler's enterprise-zone proposal frequently result in
more government intervention in economic affairs, not less. 14 8 Most zones
require administrative structures to "manage" the zones. 14 9  These
minibureaucracies are usually, in keeping with current trends, "public-private
partnerships,"'150 which administer zone funds, provide loans and venture
capital, facilitate land assembly for new projects, and provide a forum that
enables the "public participation" mandated by federal and state laws. 151 While
some studies suggest that interventionist management strategies correlate
positively with enterprise-zone success, 152 the current zones are certainly a far
cry from Hall's "essay in non-plan."
147. 26 U.S.C. § 1400E(d)(3).
148. See Richard C. Elling & Ann Workman Sheldon, Determinants of Enterprise
Zone Success: A Four State Perspective, in ENTERPRISE ZONES, supra note 122, at 136, 136
(observing that most state enterprise zones "establish a more active or interventionist
governmental presence"). As case in point, the Baltimore Empowerment Zone boasts that it
is "more of a strategic intervention than a program." See Empower Baltimore Mgmt. Corp.,
Implementing Organization, at http://www.baltimoreempowermentzone.com/aboutebmc-
implementing.html [hereinafter Implementing Organization] (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
For example, federal law establishes a competitive application process for coveted
"Empowerment Zone" status. To "compete" for a zone designation in their jurisdiction, local
governments must submit a "Strategic Plan" developed in accordance with four principles-
"strategic vision for change," "community based partnerships," "economic opportunity," and
"sustainable community development"-and reflecting five elements-"vision and values,"
"community assessment," "goals," an "implementation plan," and a "strategic planning
process." See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., BUILDING COMMUNITIES TOGETHER:
URBAN APPLICATION FORMS, available at http://www.hud.gov/nofa/ez/urbanforms.pdf (last
visited Sept. 26, 2004).
149. Briffault, supra note 140, at 510; see also Michael Brintnall & Roy E. Green,
Framework for a Comparative Analysis of State-Administered Enterprise Zone Programs, in
ENTERPRISE ZONES, supra note 122, at 75, 79 (reviewing management structures of state
enterprise zones).
150. See, e.g., Brintnall & Green, supra note 149, at 79-80 (noting that "[p]ublic-
private cooperation is of course central to the enterprise zone concept"). See generally E.S.
SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (2000) (examining the
"increasingly common" phenomenon of public-private partnerships).
151. The administrative apparatus of an empowerment zone can be quite elaborate. For
example, the Baltimore Empowerment Zone is managed by the nonprofit Empower
Baltimore Management Corporation. Over fifty individuals, representing a "broad cross-
section of community stakeholders," serve on Empower Baltimore's managing bodies, the
Board of Directors and the Advisory Council. Six smaller community organizations called
"Village Centers" further "bring a broad cross section of existing organizations into an
umbrella entity to provide oversight and implement selected strategies within [their]
geographic area[s] and develop the larger vision/strategy for their neighborhood[s]."
Implementing Organization, supra note 148.
152. See Elling & Sheldon, supra note 148, at 136, 147-49 (finding that "staffing" is
the best predictor of enterprise zone success, as measured by firm investment).
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B. Zoning for Diversity: Jane Jacobs and the New Urbanism
While enterprise-zone enthusiasts' calls for land-use deregulation in inner
cities are all but forgotten, a growing number of scholars, planners, and
architects have rediscovered Jacobs's objection to zoning laws' segregation of
land uses. 153 These individuals, particularly the new urbanists who (somewhat
tenuously) claim Jacobs as their founder, 154 target American suburbia, which,
they contend, is stultifying precisely because zoning laws prohibit a healthy
mix of residences and businesses. 155 The new urbanists champion dense,
"mixed-use" neighborhoods, where homes are situated within walking distance
of stores, restaurants, and parks. 156 They assert that commercial establishments
enhance a neighborhood by giving residents a place to go on foot and ensuring
that people will be outside, mingling amongst each other. As Philip Langdon
observes, "[T]he tavern, the cafe, the coffee shop, the neighborhood store...
have been zoned out of residential areas .... As informal gathering places
have been banished, many opportunities for making friendships and pursuing
common interests have disappeared."' 57
The new urbanists' ideal is the pre-World War II American city: a place
with a "traditional" main street and city center.1 58 And, indeed, they are best
153. See FRUG, supra note 99, at 150 (noting that "a number of architects and urban
planners have begun exploring ideas like those advanced by Jacobs" and that "[t]heir work
[is] collectively labeled 'the new urbanism"').
154. The new urbanists' claim that their planning theory embodies Jacobs's thinking is
complicated by the fact that, unlike Jacobs, new urbanists are in no way proponents of an
"organic" order. Rather, new urbanists insist upon a carefully constructed land-use scheme,
albeit one that differs dramatically from the one constructed by Euclidean zoning. For a
thoughtful critique of the new urbanists' planning agenda, see Vicki Been, Comment on
Professor Jerry Frug's The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1112-14
(1996) [hereinafter Been, Comment] ("The end result may be a uniformity that is just as, or
even more, stultifying than the current predictability in suburban design. The grid-pattern
may become the standard, rather than the cul-de-sac, but the opportunity to improve upon
both grid-pattems and cul-de-sacs through the 'laboratory' of multiple local governments
will be lost.").
155. In a popular antisuburbs diatribe, James Howard Kuntsler proclaims:
[Zoning law's] chief characteristics are the strict separation of human activities .... After
all, it's called zoning because the basic idea is that every activity demands a separate zone of
its very own .... It soon becomes obvious that the model of the human habitat dictated by
zoning is a formless, soulless, centerless, demoralizing mess. It bankrupts families and
townships. It causes mental illness. It disables whole classes of decent, normal citizens. It
ruins the air we breathe. It corrupts and deadens our spirits.
JAMES HOWARD KUNTSLER, HOME FROM NOWHERE 110-12 (2000).
156. See, e.g., Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1090-
94 (1996) (describing the "new urbanism"). The term "mixed use"-a favorite of the new
urbanists, is also attributable to Jacobs, who wrote of it as one of the conditions for vibrant
city life. See JACOBS, supra note 17, at 198.
157. PHILIP LANGDON, A BETTER PLACE TO LIVE: RESHAPING THE AMERICAN SUBURB
15-16 (1994).
158. See PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXT AMERICAN METROPOLIS 21 (1993) (praising
"the traditional American town" as alternative to suburban sprawl); ANDRES DUANY ET AL.,
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known for their attempts to recreate these communities from scratch, in places
like Celebration and Seaside, both in Florida. As a result, new urbanists face
accusations that they are nothing more than developers of high-end cutesy (or
creepy) suburban enclaves. The foundational planning principle of new
urbanism, however, is an urban one-namely, that relatively dense, mixed-use
development is necessary for healthy community life. 159 Indeed, in contrast to
the new urbanists, Jacobs herself took care to limit her critique of modem
planning principles to large cities, expressly declining to extend it to
suburbs. 
160
Jacobs viewed the segregation of uses as particularly problematic for urban
communities because they are so dependent on a healthy street life. Anyone
who has ever visited the downtown areas of many major American cities after
business hours has observed her insight in action. Because they are places
where people work, but do not live, the downtown areas of cities like Kansas
City (my hometown) are eerily deserted as soon as the clock strikes five. For
this reason, many recent (and ongoing) city redevelopment plans seek to
promote a more vibrant downtown nightlife by encouraging both residential
infill projects and higher concentrations of entertainment venues. 
16 1
Streets in other parts of major cities are similarly deserted for another
reason: many poor communities are places where people live, but no longer
where they work. A crisis of economic stagnation deprives our poorest
neighborhoods of the commercial activity that might promote a healthy street
life. In his comprehensive study of Chicago's "Black Belt," sociologist William
Julius Wilson illustrates this problem with poignant interviews. One former
resident recalled, "[There were all kinds] of stores up and down Sixty-third
SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 10-11
(2000) (praising prewar patterns of development); THE NEW URBANISM: TOWARD AN
ARCHITECTURE OF COMMUNITY x (Peter Katz ed., 1994) (asserting that the first two decades
of the twentieth century are "now coming to be regarded as a watershed era in the history of
urban design").
159. See, e.g., FRUG, supra note 99, at 151 (summarizing principles of new urbanism);
Todd W. Bressi, Planning and the American Dream, in THE NEW URBANISM, supra note
158, at xxv, xxx (describing the core principles of new urbanism); see also CONG. FOR THE
NEW URBANISM, CHARTER OF THE NEW URBANISM, available at http://www.cnu.org/
aboutcnu/index.cfm?formaction-charter&CFID=6129393&CFTOKEN= 18892760 (last
visited Sept. 26, 2004) (stating that "neighborhoods should be diverse in use and
population").
160. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 16 ("I have concentrated on great cities, and on their
inner areas .... I hope no reader will try to transfer my observations into guides as to what
goes on in towns, or little cities, or in suburbs which are still suburban .... To try to
understand towns in terms of big cities will only compound confusion.").
161. See, e.g., Downtown Council of Kansas City, Mo., Home Page, at http://
www.downtownkc.org (last visited Sept. 26, 2004); Downtown Dev. Res. Ctr., Downtown
Columbus Home Page, at http://www.downtowncolumbus.com (last visited Sept. 26, 2004);
Indianapolis Downtown, Inc., Indianapolis Downtown, Inc. Celebrates 10 Years:
Downtown's Future Looks Bright, at http://www.indydt.com/lOthannivrelease.html (last
visited Sept. 26, 2004).
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Street, and it was, you know, a fun place. Then when I came back in the
seventies, it was like . . . barren." 162 A current resident, an elderly woman,
similarly worried, "It's not safe anymore because the streets aren't. When all
the black businesses and shows closed down, the economy went to the dogs.
The stores, the businesses, the shows, everywhere was lighted."'163 Wilson
notes that the number of businesses in the South Side neighborhood of
Woodlawn declined from over eight hundred to fewer than one hundred, and
that most of the remaining businesses are "tiny catering places, barber shops,
and thrift stores." 164 As the economic decline progressed, public spaces once
filled with busy shoppers have become the "turf' for gang members and drug
dealers, a reality which forces law-abiding citizens to choose between moving
(if economically possible) and remaining behind closed doors. 165
Curbing disorder may be a necessary prerequisite to economic renewal in
many urban communities. 166 But the indirect economic benefits of order-
maintenance policies are by no means guaranteed. The new urbanists, however,
offer a number of ways that comprehensive land-use reforms can
simultaneously promote economic vitality and stifle disorder. First, to the
extent current land-use regulations prohibit the mixed-use environments that
162. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 5 (1996).
163. Id. at 4-5.
164. Id. at 5.
165. See Meares & Kahan, Law and (Norms o]) Order, supra note 7, at 823 (arguing
that disorder drives law-abiders from a neighborhood or forces them to avoid the streets).
The California Supreme Court described such an atmosphere of fear when it upheld the use
of public nuisance laws to control gang activity in the Rocksprings neighborhood of San
Jose, California:
Rocksprings is an urban war zone.... The people of this community are prisoners in their
own homes. Violence and the threat of violence are constant. Residents remain indoors,
especially at night. They do not allow their children to play outside. Strangers wearing the
wrong color clothing are at risk. Relatives and friends refuse to visit. The laundry rooms, the
trash dumpsters, the residents' vehicles, and their parking spaces are used to deal and stash
drugs. Verbal harassment, physical intimidation, threats of retaliation, and retaliation are the
likely fate of anyone who complains of the gang's illegal activities or tells police where
drugs may be hidden.
People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 601-02 (Cal. 1997) (affirming trial court order
enjoining gang members from engaging in conduct constituting a "public nuisance" in the
Rocksprings area of San Jose, California). Prior to enacting the ordinance at issue in
Morales, the Chicago City Council heard similar testimony about life in some Chicago
neighborhoods. For example, eighty-eight-year-old Susan Mary Jackson testified, "1 am
scared to go out in the daytime .... I don't go to the store because I am afraid." City of
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. at 101 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Another long-time resident
similarly testified,
I have never had the terror that I feel every day when I walk down the streets of
Chicago.... I get intimidated on a daily basis, and it's come to the point where I say, well,
do I go out today. Do I put my ax in my briefcase. Do I walk around dressed like a bum so I
am not looking rich or got any money or anything like that.
Id.
166. See GROGAN & PROSCIO, supra note 42, at 152-53 (discussing the "staggering
benefit" of order restoration and asserting that the "pace and scale of the urban rejuvenation
is therefore intimately connected to the rise in public safety").
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foster healthy street life, "zoning for diversity" (to again borrow a term from
Jacobs) 167 can help reinvigorate the economic and social climate of poor
communities. As Neal Katyal observes, "many current zoning practices
disregard or even work against crime prevention goals."'16 8 Encouraging the
coexistence of residential and commercial land uses may give people reason to
leave their homes and mingle on the sidewalks. And increasing the number of
law-abiding users of the sidewalks may check the disorder caused by the
criminal element that currently "controls" too many urban public spaces.
Second, the new urbanists argue for changes to land-use regulations that
they think currently favor building designs that are antithetical to public safety.
For example, many zoning laws require buildings to be set back away from
streets and fronted with significant numbers of parking spaces, thus precluding
the development of an attractive "street wall" and limiting the opportunity for
informal surveillance of the street by building occupants. 169 Modem planning
codes also favor wide residential streets without sidewalks, discouraging
pedestrian uses of public spaces.70 These and other factors encourage people
to remain inside their homes, or-if they are not residents-to drive through,
rather than linger in, a neighborhood. When this occurs, would-be informal
monitors of disorder are converted to disinterested passers-by, much as the
reform-era reliance on patrol cars extricated the beat officer from intimate
involvement in community life. 17 1 Thus, new-urbanist-favored design
standards-especially sidewalks, on-street parking or rear parking lots, shallow
building setbacks, and front porches-may minimize crime. 172 These
"traditional" designs may themselves encourage informal social interaction that
fosters urban vitality and a healthy community life.
173
167. See FRUG, supra note 99, at 149 (observing that Jacobs "urged America's cities to
replace 'zoning for conformity' with 'zoning for diversity').
168. Katyal, supra note 10, at 1108.
169. See, e.g., id. at 1109 (discussing building setbacks and sidewalks). Architects and
planners promoting the concept of "defensible space" have argued that planning codes
should reflect the crime-control potential of urban design since the mid-1970s. On defensible
space, see generally HENRY CISNEROS, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: DETERRING CRIME AND BUILDING
COMMUNITY (1995); OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH
URBAN DESIGN (1972); BARRY POYNER, DESIGN AGAINST CRIME: BEYOND DEFENSIBLE
SPACE (1983); Sally E. Merry, Defensible Space Undefended: Social Factors in Crime
Control Through Environmental Design, 16 URB. AFF. Q. 397 (1981).
170. See FRUG, supra note 99, at 150-54.
171. I am indebted to Bruce Khula for this point.
172. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 1109.
173. The new urbanists' arguments about the need for proactive incorporation of
community-friendly building designs in poor communities have also influenced the federal
government's massive overhaul of public housing. The federal "Hope VI" program, see
supra note 114, funds the demolition of distressed units and the development of mixed-
income projects to replace them. See, e.g., Patrick E. Clancy & Leo Quigley, Hope VI: A
Vital Tool for Comprehensive Neighborhood Revitalization, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL'Y 527 (2001) (describing the program). Between 1996 and 2002, the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development funded the demolition of 49,828 public housing units. See
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C. A Test Case in East Harlem
New York City has embraced zoning reform as part of an effort to improve
the area of Manhattan known as East or "Spanish" Harlem. 174 This primarily
Latino community is one of the city's poorest. 175 For over a decade,
Community Board Eleven, which represents East Harlem, has examined
economic development and land-use policy in the area. The community's land-
use problems are immediately apparent. Located in a city with a "perpetual"
housing crisis, 176 East Harlem is a primarily residential community that lost
more than half of its residents and many thousands of its residences (over
sixteen thousand housing units) in the latter half of the twentieth century. 177 In
large part because East Harlem was the "beneficiary" of a great deal of urban-
renewal attention, the area has the highest concentration of public housing units
in the city. Forty percent of residents live in public housing, most in now-
discredited "towers-in-a-park"-style projects on "superblocks."1 78  An
additional twenty-two percent of the residential units are in private,
U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HOPE VI DEMOLITION GRANTS: FY 1996-2002 (August
2003), at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/prograns/ph/hope6/grants/demolitionl2002master-
dem.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2004). Some replacement units have been, or will be,
incorporated into new mixed-income developments like Chicago's Northshore Village,
which is located on the site of the notorious Cabrini-Green housing project. See Robert
Sharoff, In Chicago, an Attempt to Upgrade a Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2000, at
K7. New urbanist architects and developers have played a large role in these "revitalization
projects," including providing design guidelines and training for HUD employees charged
with implementing the program. See Hope VI Funds New Urban Neighborhoods, NEW URB.
NEWS, Jan./Feb. 2002 ("The Congress for the New Urbanism (CNU) was instrumental in
providing design guidelines and training for HUD in implementing the program.
Architectural firms garnering the most Hope VI work have been CNU members."). The
latest round of HUD Hope VI grants, for example, went almost exclusively to funding new-
urbanist inspired "traditional neighborhood" developments. Id.; see also The Cmty. Builders,
Inc., Hope VI Projects, at http://www.communitybuilders.org/what we- do/hopevi_
projects.htm#pdv (describing various Hope VI projects that are "patterned on the principals
[sic] of New Urbanism," including "architectural detailing" and "landscaped boulevards,
public parks and pedestrian walks").
174. Thanks go to my student, Scott Bibb, for telling me about this effort. Unless
otherwise indicated, all information about East Harlem is taken from the materials listed at
NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 21.
175. See Manhattan Cmty. Bd. #11, Demographic & Social Economic Profile, http://
www.east-harlem.com/cbll_197Ademographic.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2004) (noting
that 1990 unemployment rate in East Harlem (sixteen percent) was nearly twice that of New
York City as a whole, and that median income was less than fifty percent of metro area
income).
176. See Michael H. Schill & Benjamin P. Scafidi, Housing Conditions and Problems
in New York City, in HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK CITY, supra
note 70, at 11.
177. The rate of housing loss in East Harlem outpaces that of New York City, see
Manhattan Cmty. Bd. #11, supra note 175, which has a higher than average rate of loss
(approximately fourteen thousand. units per year) than other major cities. See Salins, supra
note 70, at 53-55.
178. See Manhattan Cmty. Bd. #11, supra note 175.
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government-subsidized buildings. Home ownership rates are among the lowest
in a city of renters. 179 And, despite a citywide housing crunch, East Harlem has
a higher concentration of vacant housing than the rest of New York City. 180
The second-most-prevalent land use in East Harlem (after public housing)
is vacant property. 181 About twenty-five percent of land in East Harlem is
vacant or contains deteriorated buildings. As with public housing, many vacant
lots are a hangover from the urban renewal era; over eighty thousand square
feet (nearly two acres) of property is officially categorized as "urban renewal
property," meaning that it has been vacant since it was condemned some thirty-
odd years ago for urban renewal projects that never materialized. The City of
New York itself owns nearly one hundred vacant properties in the area, most
obtained either for urban renewal or in tax foreclosures. 182 Less than nine
percent of East Harlem property is used for commercial enterprises, and street-
level commercial activity is hindered by the prevailing land uses: The high-rise
public housing projects on superblocks discourage foot traffic, in part because
developers eliminated cross streets to create public housing sites. And the flow
of commercial traffic is further disrupted by a number of large health care
institutions in the community. Not surprisingly, East Harlem can hardly be
described as a "vibrant" community. Community Board member Debby
Quinones recently quipped that "when you get off the subway in East Harlem,
it's like you're in the Stone Age."'183
The Community Board's decade-long examination culminated in a formal
rezoning proposal, which the City Planning Commission endorsed and the City
Council approved, with a few minor changes, on June 24, 2003.184 The new
zoning scheme seeks to increase community vitality in three ways. First, most
179. See Introduction: Housing Policy in the New Fiscal Environment, in HOUSING
AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 70, at 2 (noting that "over
70 percent of all housing in New York City is renter occupied, compared to only 59 and 38
percent in Chicago and Philadelphia respectively").
180. See DENISE PREVETI & MICHAEL H. SCHILL, THE STATE OF NEW YORK CITY'S
HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS 2003, at 6, 18 (compiling data on 2002 New York City
vacancy rates by neighborhood, and noting that citywide vacancy rate was 2.9% and that
East Harlem vacancy rate was 4.3%), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/realestatecenter/
CREUPPapers/State of theCity/Chapter%201.pdf.
181. As of 1995, 937 of the 3823 lots (nearly twenty-five percent) in East Harlem were
classified as "vacant land" by the Department of City Planning. High-rise public housing
units comprise one-third of the total block area of the community. See Manhattan Cmty. Bd.
#11, Land Use, http://www.east-harlem.com/cbl l197Ajlanduse.htm (last visited Oct. 18,
2004).
182. See SALINS & MILDNER, supra note 68, at 142 (quantifying New York City's in
rem portfolio of housing units obtained through tax foreclosures).
183. See Miriam Kreinin Souccar, El Barrio: Left Behind and Angry, CRAIN'S N.Y.
Bus., Jan. 13, 2003, at 20.
184. See N.Y. City Dep't of City Planning, supra note 21. East Harlem's zoning had
not been comprehensively changed since 1961. N.Y. City Dep't of City Planning, East
Harlem Rezoning Proposal-Approved: Rezoning Objectives, http://home.nyc.gov/html/
dcp/html/eastharlem/eastharleml.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
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of East Harlem was formerly zoned "R7-2," a designation that requires
relatively deep setbacks and significant amounts of off-street parking. 185 As the
Community Board's formal request noted, this designation was consistent with
the area's "tower-in-the-park" projects. But it discouraged commercial activity
and prevented the creation of a "street wall" appropriate for an urban area. The
Planning Commission thus recommended a new residential zoning designation
that permits shallower setbacks to encourage the development of a physical
infrastructure that enlivens the community. 186 Second, the rezoning eliminates
most off-street parking requirements in the area's "commercial overlays,"
where limited commercial activity is permitted in residential zones. As the
Planning Commission acknowledged, these requirements imposed a regulatory
burden on small businesses; 187 they also resulted in the dedication of large
sections of the community to unsightly (and potentially dangerous) parking
facilities. Third, the rezoning also adds a new commercial overlay along one
block of 1 16th Street.
188
The rezoning may work. Central Harlem is said to be undergoing a
"second renaissance," with high-end retail establishments opening weekly
along West 125th Street and professionals renovating old brownstones (and
building new ones). Proponents of the zoning changes clearly hope that they
will help East Harlem join the renaissance. Of course, the zoning reforms are
hardly a purist's dream. The new scheme actually increases the number of
different zoning designations from eleven to fourteen. With the important
exception of eliminating off-street parking requirements in commercial
overlays, no effort was made to eliminate regulatory barriers to entrepreneurial
activities by area residents. Those who seek to start a business must run a
daunting regulatory gauntlet that begins with the headache-inducing task of
deciphering which activities are permitted in the different overlay zones. For
example, property on some streets is zoned C1-5, but on others C2-5. And, on
others, Cl-5 and C2-5 designations occur on opposite sides of the same street.
(This is actually an improvement; there previously were five different overlay
designations in the area. 189) Commercial activity continues to be prohibited on
185. See Manhattan Cmty. Bd. #11, supra note 181 ("The R7-2 zoning districts has
[sic] a high open space ratio (OSR) and requires parking for one half of the new units
built.").
186. See N.Y. City Dep't of City Planning, supra note 184.
187. See N.Y. City Dep't of City Planning, East Harlem Rezoning Proposal-
Approved: Proposed Zoning Changes Affecting Use, http://home.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/
eastharlem/eastharlem3b.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) ("C1-5 and C2-5 commercial
overlays are proposed to replace existing C1 -4 and C2-4 commercial overlays throughout the
rezoning area. This eliminates commercial parking requirements that could burden some
commercial uses and provides more flexibility for new commercial uses.").
188. Id.
189. The foregoing description of East Harlem's zoning scheme comes from N.Y. City
Dep't of City Planning, East Harlem Rezoning Proposal-Approved: Existing Zoning,
http://home.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/eastharlem/eastharlem2gr.html (last visited Sept. 26,
2004).
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most east-west streets. The most significant change-the adoption of a new
residential zoning classification for much of the area-takes advantage of the
Planning Code's provision for "contextual" zones (i.e., special classifications
suited for the "context" of a neighborhood). Such neighborhood-specific
zoning classifications have themselves been criticized for impeding
development efforts. 190
That said, public-choice factors likely make the kinds of comprehensive
deregulation advocated by Stuart Butler in the 1980s or the tightly controlled
reforms of today's new urbanists a near impossibility.19 1 Local governments
have demonstrated a particularly strong attachment to zoning despite decades
of criticism from all sides. 192 Not only does local officials' significant interest
in maintaining their broad authority over land-use regulation make them
resistant to change, 19 3 but the number of politically powerful groups with
similarly strong interests in the regulatory status quo suggests that any proposal
of comprehensive land-use reform would open up a Pandora's box of interest
group politics. 194 East Harlem's success within the existing framework of
190. See Salins, supra note 70, at 62, 68 (recommending that the city eliminate most
special zoning districts and rules).
191. I myself am skeptical about the wisdom of the new urbanists' plan to replace
zoning laws with detailed design standards.
192. See Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of
Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2174 (2002) (noting that zoning has
"weathered profound societal, political, and ideological shifts on the Court and in the
American polity"). For a sampling of the academic criticisms of zoning, see, for example,
RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966); RICHARD F. BABCOCK & CHARLES L.
SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED (1985); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF
ZONING LAWS (1985); ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS 4 (1987); FRUG, supra note 99;
MARTIN A. GARRETT, JR., LAND USE REGULATION (1987); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, THE
ZONING DILEMMA (1971); ROBERT NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 173 (1977);
CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN AMERICA
(1977); RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY (1996); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND
USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972); ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM (Charles M. Haar &
Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989); see also, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1973);
Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise Development
System, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 28, 46 (1981).
193. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3 (1990) (characterizing the power to regulate land
use as the "most important local regulatory power"); William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl,
Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 57, 92-93
(1999) (discussing local governments' traditional dominant role in land-use regulation);
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 181 (2001)
[hereinafter Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise] (discussing public-choice arguments on
why local governments avoid surrendering power to regulate land use).
194. See, e.g., BABCOCK, supra note 192; WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS 229-31 (2001) [hereinafter FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS] (discussing
"homeowner anxieties" and preference for open-space zoning); FISCHEL, supra note 192;
William W. Buzbee, Sprawl's Political-Economy and the Case for a Metropolitan Green
Space Initiative, 32 URB. LAW. 367, 373-78 (2000) (describing the interests involved in the
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zoning, in other words, may represent a textbook example of the "second best"
principle in action.
III. PROPERTY REGULATION AND NORMS OF ORDER
These public-choice impediments to comprehensive regulatory reform
undoubtedly are reinforced by the traditional assumption that order-
construction regulations themselves suppress disorder. The theoretical
foundations of order-maintenance policies would seem to support this
assumption. Social norms scholars argue that government intervention is key to
order restoration. They posit that public efforts are necessary first steps toward
reinvigorating the informal social controls that check disorder and crime.
195
Thus, it is easy to see why city officials would assume that public nuisance
suits and code enforcement sweeps fit within a broken windows policy manual.
By using nuisance suits and code enforcement to remediate property blight,
government officials seek to signal to other property owners that neglect and
abandonment will not be tolerated in a community, no matter how poor. And
efforts to encourage private groups to file public nuisance suits empower
community members to make their own statement that certain property
conditions and uses are simply unacceptable. It is hardly surprising, therefore,
that policies promoting public nuisance suits by community groups frequently
speak in terms of community empowerment. The Philadelphia District
Attorney's Nuisance Task Force promises, for example, that it will "work in
partnership with citizens like you" to "help you eliminate a nuisance in your
neighborhood and give you back what has wrongfully been taken from you-
the peaceful enjoyment of your home, your street, your community."
'196
But the claims supporting changes in order-construction regulations,
discussed in Part II, do not mesh neatly with standard broken windows theory.
On the contrary, they rest on the assumption that government intervention to
promote order is a problem, not a solution, in our cities. A similar argument
was made about police efforts around the time that Wilson and Kelling
articulated the broken windows hypothesis. Proponents of "depolicing" argued
that a decreased police presence was needed because communities became too
dependent upon official police protection and ceased to engage in private
policing measures, including "preventive surveillance," local dispute
settlement, and similar forms of self-help. 197 Depolicing theory is in keeping
"smart growth" debate); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 394-409 (1977) (discussing homeowner and developer
influence over land-use law).
195. See, e.g, sources cited supra note 7.
196. See Pub. Nuisance Task Force, Phila. Dist. Attorney's Office, Community Guide
to Nuisance Enforcement (n.d.) (on file with author).
197. See Donald Black & M.P. Baumgartner, On Self-Help in Modern Society, in
DONALD BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE 193, 195-99 (1980).
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with the standard law and economics literature on deterrence, which suggests
that high levels of law enforcement will present a moral hazard problem. That
is, private citizens will have inadequate incentives to take private steps to deter
and condemn crime and disorder. 198 Just as depolicing proponents argued that
public efforts to control crime and disorder backfire, advocates of
"deconstructing" the order of city land uses assert that government intervention
to impose order stands in the way of organic forces that help check disorder.
The perceived success of order-maintenance policies would seem to
suggest that depolicing theory was wrongheaded, and that social norms
scholars correctly emphasize the importance of relatively vigorous government
disorder-suppression policies. Perhaps it follows, therefore, that relaxing order-
construction regulations might lead to more disorder, not less. This possibility
might lead some city residents to be wary of proposals to deconstruct city land
uses. As Skogan aptly observes, while Jacobs offers an order-maintenance
justification for mixed-use environments, the premise of her work actually is
that we have a taste for disorder in urban environments. 199 For this reason,
even critics of the order constructed by zoning laws tend to favor tightly
controlled regulatory changes, rather than the radical deregulation proposed by
early enterprise-zone enthusiasts. For example, while Katyal advocates using
land-use laws to encourage a diversity of land uses, he also warns that "these
strategies carry costs and cannot be implemented until those costs have been
weighed against crime reduction and other benefits. '200 Similarly, Jerry Frug
asserts that current land-use laws should be scrapped and replaced with an
equally detailed code favoring mixed-use environments. 201
Other scholars go so far as to cite the lack of (or laxly enforced) rules
segregating land uses in poor minority neighborhoods as evidence of
"environmental racism." Jon Dubin asserts that "[r]esidents deprived of zoning
protection are vulnerable to assaults on the safety, quality, and integrity of their
communities ranging from dangerous and environmentally toxic hazards to
more commonplace hazards, such as vile odors, loud noises, blighting
appearances, and traffic congestion. ' 20 2 The answer, according to Dubin, is to
198. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal
Incentives for Private Precautions Against Crime, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 434,435-36 (1995);
Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law
Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1193 (1994); Keith N. Hylton,
Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution, 72 RAND J. EcON. 197,201-02 (1996).
199. See JACOBS, supra note 17, at 238 (asserting that the "strange and unpredictable
uses and peculiar scenes" are a strength of healthy city life); SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 7
(describing Jacobs as an "urban utopian" who "claim[s] that a measure of disorder is actually
good for us").
200. Katyal, supra note 10, at 1109.
201. See FRUG, CITY MAKING, supra note 99, at 145-55 (proposing alternatives to
current land-use regulations); Been, Comment, supra note 154, at 1112-14 (expressing
concern that the new urbanist agenda may result in the overregulation of land uses).
202. Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to
Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 742 (1993).
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strengthen order-construction regulations in poor neighborhoods and to use
these regulations to suppress the physical disorder that plagues these
communities.
These critiques thus suggest that the land-use reforms outlined in Part II
might do more harm than good. But, in so doing, the critiques also disregard
the significant social and economic costs imposed by order-construction
regulations. For example, it may be true that low-income entrepreneurs, if freed
from the regulatory straightjacket imposed by the order-construction regime,
might open the types of business establishments sometimes equated with urban
decay. These businesses, such as auto repair businesses, pawn shops, "hole-in-
the-wall" restaurants, hair salons, etc., likely are attractive to individuals with
limited education and training. But when confronted with a community where a
run-down bodega remains the only viable business, a policymaker must ask
whether this lone commercial establishment signals total hopelessness, or, on
the contrary, shows that at least someone is trying to make a go of it there.
Before using the Dubin critique as a reason to resist regulatory reform, the
policymaker must further consider whether the addition of a new bodega, hair-
braiding salon, or auto repair business might lead to less disorder, not more, by
generating the foot traffic that Jacobs and the new urbanists argue fosters
healthy and safe street life, by filling previously vacant storefronts, etc.
Obviously, regulatory reforms that abandon or relax the order constructed
by zoning rules, thus inviting these questions, entail risk. But, they also offer
the hope-perhaps, the best hope-for true renewal in struggling urban
communities. Moreover, for the reasons discussed in the remainder of this Part,
these reforms can be reconciled with the social norms justifications for the
order-maintenance agenda. Indeed, deconstructing our cities may prove crucial
to success of that enterprise.
Both Dubin and Yale Rabin have suggested that such zoning practices sometimes are
racially motivated. See id.; Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid,
in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds.,
1989); see also ROBERT D. BULLARD, INVISIBLE HOUSTON: THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN BOOM
AND BUST 63-70 (1987) (discussing the problems attributable to commercial enterprises in
Houston's (unzoned) African-American residential neighborhoods); Been, Comment, supra
note 154, at 1113 (noting that "[n]ot all land use is bad, and not all zoning is misguided or
harmful to the poor and to minorities. Indeed, it is ironic that one of the major forms of
expulsive zoning that poor African American and Hispanic neighborhoods complain about is
the mixing of uses-the very 'improvement' that forms one of the cornerstones of the new
urbanism"). There is a substantial "environmental justice" literature examining whether
undesirable land uses are sited in minority neighborhoods or poor and minority families are
attracted to those neighborhoods because of lower property values. On this related "chicken
and egg" problem, see Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority
Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383 (1994);
Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A
Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1997); Thomas
Lambert & Christopher Boerner, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes, Economic
Solutions, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 195 (1997).
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A. City-Suburb Competition
First, any effort to weigh the relative costs and benefits of reforming land-
use laws to encourage diversity of uses must include the reality of city-suburb
competition. It may be true, as Jacobs argues, that some Americans have a taste
for urban life. But it is indisputable that, over the past half-century, major cities
have declined as first residents and then businesses left for greener suburban
pastures. Although there are many reasons for this decline, 203 a major culprit is
the structure of local government law, which encourages the development of
"metropolitan areas" with major cities ringed by many dozens, if not hundreds,
of independent municipalities. Economist Charles Tiebout influentially
predicted that, within this system, municipalities will "compete" for residents
by offering attractive packages of goods and services. 20 4
Central-city governments recognize this fact, and have long tried to
compete with suburbs for development and investment. For example, the
"new" empowerment/enterprise-zone strategies discussed above are just the tip
of the competition iceberg. The current economic development landscape is
characterized by a dizzying array of subsidized financing, tax abatements,
infrastructure improvements, and other "goodies. ' '20 5 Regulatory concessions
203. Possible contributors include white flight (and racism), aging infrastructure,
changes in the nation's economic base, incompetent city governments, and Americans'
preference for open spaces. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 162, at 3-50 (1996) (discussing
economic causes of inner city poverty); Briffault, supra note 193, at 11 (discussing causes of
central cities' downward spiral); Buzbee, supra note 193, at 60-70 (1999) (discussing
"sprawl's harms"); Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise, supra note 193, at 178 (discussing
American housing preferences).
204. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416(1956).
205. Consider the extremes to which state and local governments have proven willing
to go in the past decade. A California municipality sought to pay the owner of valuable
commercial real estate a $38 million condemnation award in order to sell the property to the
wholesale giant Costco, Inc., for $1. See 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency,
237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001). To attract a new NASCAR racetrack, Kansas
amended its urban redevelopment law to allow NASCAR to qualify for tax increment
financing, declared part of economically depressed Wyandotte County a "major tourism
area," condemned a large portion of a blue-collar neighborhood to make way for a new auto
racetrack, and exempted the racetrack from all property taxes for thirty years. Kansas ex rel.
Tomasic v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, 962 P.2d 543, 549-50 (Kan.
1998). Alabama sought to attract a Mercedes-Benz plant by offering to acquire and improve
the factory site, buy 2500 of the vehicles produced, and train and pay the salary of workers
for one year. Ivan C. Dale, Comment, Economic Development Incentives, Accountability
Legislation and a Double Negative Commerce Clause, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 247, 253 (2002)
(describing several incentive packages). A Michigan incentives package offered to a paper
recycling mill cost the state $2.4 million per job. Id. And Amarillo, Texas, mailed a check
for $8 million to each of 1300 companies around the country; each company was invited to
cash the check in exchange for a commitment to create seven hundred new jobs in the city.
See Melvin L. Burstein & Arthur J. Rolnick, Congress Should End the Economic War
Among the States, REGION, Mar. 1995, http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/arl994.cfin (last
visited Sept. 26, 2004) (noting that "[w]hat is so remarkable about these ... initiatives is that
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are sometimes included in a "package" of incentives, especially to encourage
the redevelopment of contaminated "brownfields. '206 Unfortunately, the
available empirical evidence suggests that fierce intergovernmental
competition renders these strategies-which seek to attract larger employers to
a city-ineffective. 20
7
If cities are to compete successfully, their leaders must do more than offer
economic incentives. Importantly, they must recognize that role that local
power over land-use policy-a local government's "most important local
regulatory power" 208-plays in city-suburb competition. 209 The standard
account of city-suburb competition provides that local government power over
land use leads inevitably to a tragedy-of-the-commons situation within a
metropolitan area.2 10 Each suburban government, viewed as coequal in the
eyes of the law,2 11 jealously guards its authority to regulate land use so as to
maximize local tax revenues (and resident satisfaction).2 12 More affluent
suburbs tend to accomplish these goals with exclusionary zoning techniques
that freeze out new development, pushing it to the urban fringe.
2 13
they are not remarkable").
206. See generally Michael Allan Wolf, Dangerous Crossing: State Brownfields
Recycling and Federal Enterprise Zoning, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 495 (1998).
207. See, e.g., INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, MINDING THE CANDY STORE:
STATE AUDITS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 35-41 (2000) (summarizing fifteen state audits
that show development incentives are generally ineffective); Enrich, supra note 140, at 390-
405 (1996) (summarizing economic evidence and concluding that "[f]rom the states'
collective vantage point, the net effect of the incentive competition is, in fact, far worse than
zero-sum. For, although the states can expect to achieve no overall gain in business activity
or jobs, they do incur a very substantial loss of tax revenues"); Franklin J. James, Economic
Development: A Zero-Sum Game?, in URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 157, 161 (Richard
D. Bingham & John P. Blair eds., 1984) ("There is no convincing empirical evidence that
urban economic development as currently practiced is more than a zero sum game."); Schill,
supra note 112, at 810 (1991) ("Another reason for the limited usefulness of economic
development incentives is their ubiquity. Since many jurisdictions offer these benefits they
cease to generate an advantage for any particular locale."). But cf Gillette, supra note 140, at
452-78 (1997) (questioning argument that incentives are usually a net loss for the offering
jurisdiction).
208. Briffault, supra note 193, at 3.
209. See, e.g., Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 506-28 (1991) (arguing
that local governments use land-use regulations to compete for residents); see also FISCHEL,
supra note 192, at 214-20 (analyzing land-use powers in the twenty-five largest U.S. cities).
210. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 193, at 163 (reviewing literature).
211. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 349 (1990) (noting that "local government law does not distinguish
within the category of municipal corporation between city and suburb").
212. Id. at 366 (linking suburban autonomy and local land-use regulation); Richard
Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1115, 1134-35 (1996).
213. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 194, at 229-31 (attributing
sprawl to "homeowner anxieties" and preference for open-space zoning); Briffault, supra
note 212, at 1135-36 (noting that affluent communities use exclusionary zoning to preserve
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Communities located on that fringe, recognizing their competitive advantage,
encourage development by relaxing zoning laws. Increased sprawl-and urban
disinvestment-inevitably results from this pattern of exclusion and
invitation.
2 14
In order to compete effectively, city governments must play to their land-
use strengths. To the extent that city neighborhoods have any competitive land-
use advantage over suburban ones, it likely is that some Americans do in fact
have a taste for diverse urban environments. In other words, city residents
should hope that Jacobs was right, and that the downfall of urban
neighborhoods was caused by policies designed to make their land uses more
orderly and suburban.2 15 Unfortunately, many city officials fail to consider
whether their longstanding order-construction regulatory policy hamstrings
their ability to compete. For example, while many cities use "urbanness" to
promote downtown redevelopment, 2 16 some cities continue to experiment with
large-scale projects that seek to incorporate "suburban-office-park"
developments into their urban environments. 2 17 It seems unlikely that
downtown sites will prove the most attractive for large-scale developers. The
suburban and exurban alternatives have too many advantages: more responsive
public officials, less traffic, easier access to major highways, better schools,
fewer land assembly problems, etc. 218 The problem of assembling a parcel of
land large enough for even a small-scale development is itself enough to deter
new entrants, unless the local government is willing to exercise the costly
(fiscally and politically) power of eminent domain.
2 19
their high tax bases); Jerry Frug, supra note 156, at 1083-84 (describing use of exclusionary
zoning).
214. See FISCHEL, supra note 192, at 55 (attributing "'leap frog' pattern of
development" to exclusionary zoning in central suburbs that forces new development to
outer-ring suburbs with more favorable political climates); FRUG, supra note 99, at 17-25
(attributing the decline in central-city fortunes to city powerlessness over, among other
things, extraterritorial land uses); Briffault, supra note 212, at 1135 (attributing development
pattern to exclusionary zoning in affluent communities).
215. See JACOBS, supra note 17, at 16 ("We are in enough trouble already from trying
to understand big cities in terms of the behavior, and the imagined behavior, of towns.").
216. See supra note 160.
217. For example, Omaha, Nebraska, has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to
redevelop its riverfront from an abandoned brownfield into the headquarters of ConAgra,
Inc. and main campus of Gallup University (the polling organization). See Lively Omaha,
Riverfront Update, at http://www.livelyomaha.org/whatsnew/riverfront/update.htm (last
visited Sept. 26, 2004).
218. See, e.g., Been, Comment, supra note 154 (discussing economic motivations for
suburban sprawl); Buzbee, supra note 193, at 63-68 (discussing causes and benefits of
suburban sprawl).
219. For example, although twenty-five percent of the land in East Harlem is vacant,
most of the vacant properties are small lots of less than five thousand square feet; only a
handful are classified "large assemblages" (more than ten thousand square feet). See
Manhattan Cmty. Bd. #11, City-Owned Vacant Property, http://www.east-harlem.com/
cbl 1_97A cityowned.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004). See generally Garnett, supra note
107.
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Cities will not find it easy to sell their urban life. In fact, new urbanist
developers may recreate dense, mixed-use neighborhoods in the suburbs that
are in many ways better than their older urban counterparts (i.e., safer, with
better schools and new, low-maintenance buildings). Still, it seems reasonable
to assert that cities should concentrate on being urban, because a city is likely
to be better at being urban than at being suburban. 220 And, despite the
significant obstacles to effective competition, the 1990s happily saw many
urban success stories--Central Harlem, once a symbol of urban despair, is
now, as noted above, undergoing a "second renaissance" attributed in large part
to the federal Empowerment Zone program; 221 Chicago's notorious Cabrini-
Green housing projects are being replaced with upscale condominiums; 222 and
the dot-corn phenomenon transformed San Francisco's Mission District.
Unfortunately, it remains a cold, hard reality that many of the communities
that have suffered the most from the spiral of urban decline can never hope for
this kind of a boom.223 East Harlem might expect a renaissance like that
experienced by Central Harlem. It enjoys the benefit of geography, since it is
located on Manhattan Island, just north of the wealthy Upper East Side.224 But
consider, in contrast, the development prospects of Chicago's Englewood
neighborhood. Englewood was one of the communities featured in Wilson's
comprehensive study, discussed above, of Chicago's "Black Belt." It also
earned a stop on former President Clinton's "New Markets" tour, which sought
to highlight communities that had not shared in the prosperity of the 1990s.
225
The population of Englewood is ninety-six percent African-American, and
nearly forty-four percent of residents fall below the federal poverty line.
226
220. This conclusion might be seen to follow from a variant of the economic theory of
comparative advantage. See Economist.com, Economics A-Z, at http://www.economist.com/
research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?TERM=COMPARATIVE%20ADVANTAGE#COMP
ARATIVE%20ADVANTAGE (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) (describing the theory of
comparative advantage as follows: "[I]t pays countries to trade because they are different. It
is impossible for a country to have no comparative advantage in anything. It may be the least
efficient at everything, but it will still have a comparative advantage in the industry in which
it is relatively least bad").
221. See Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone Dev. Corp., Home Page, at http://
www.umez.org/home.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
222. See, e.g., Sharoff, supra note 173, at K7.
223. See generally WILSON, supra note 162 (chronicling life on Chicago's South Side).
224. Of course, such gentrification has its costs, especially the displacement of long-
term residents. On the link between land-use policy and gentrification, see, for example,
Dubin, supra note 202, at 768-72.
225. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Fighting Poverty, President and Speaker Find a
Moment of Unity, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1999, at A10.
226. See SBC, YELLOW PAGES: ENGLEWOOD, ILLINOIS 2, at http:II
sbcsmartyellowpages.com/pages/documents/20571.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) (listing
racial population statistics for Englewood); Chi. Tribune, 2000 Census Database: Wages and
Workforce, at http://www.chicagotribune.com/classified/realestate/chi-020515census-
income,0,1933037.formprofile (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) (stating that 43.8% of Englewood
residents fall below the poverty line).
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Crime is a problem, although rates fell steadily in the 1990s, after the city of
Chicago began a comprehensive community-policing effort in the Englewood
community.
227
In places like Englewood, the need to reconsider the longstanding
assumption that ordered land uses suppress disorder is a policy imperative.
Englewood likely will never gentrify. Chicago has invested substantial
resources toward redeveloping Englewood (parts of the community fall in a
Federal Empowerment Zone as well as a state enterprise zone). 228 One major
retail development project--complete with a new urbanist design-is planned
for the area's main thoroughfare. 229 Government intervention might succeed in
attracting a few projects like this retail center, which is located on land that the
city acquired and donated to the developer. But, these projects likely cannot
turn a community around on their own. Furthermore, the prospect of being
"saved" by an outsider may generate resentment by residents.2 30 And,
successful redevelopment projects frequently raise concerns about the
displacement that accompanies gentrification. 231 An economic renewal
promoted by land-use reforms that seek to unleash the entrepreneurial energies
of local residents is not only the most realistic hope for places like Englewood,
but it might prove to be a more organic and sustainable one as well.
227. See Crime and Community Policing, by the Numbers, CHI. REP., Dec. 1999, at
http://chicagoreporter.com/1999/12-99/1299capsgraphics.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
The Englewood community made national headlines a few years ago when two young boys,
ages seven and eight, were charged with the first-degree murder of another child. The
charges were subsequently dropped. Joshua Howes, Englewood Leaders Urge City to Create
Jobs, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2003, at C2.
228. See Howes, supra note 227, at C2 (noting that, in 1999, Chicago mayor Richard
Daley announced $256 million in public and private projects to revitalize the Englewood
community).
229. See David Roeder, Englewood Project Has Backing of Big Names, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, May 30, 2002, at 49.
230. See Howes, supra note 227, at C2 (reporting community leaders are resentful that
most of the construction on the project is being done by outside firms and employees).
231. Some observers have claimed that the revival of downtown Cincinnati-spurred
on by two new professional sports stadiums-and the city's concerted efforts to redevelop
the black neighborhood known as Over-the-Rhine fueled racial tensions that led to the 2001
riots. See Wesley Hogan, Cincinnati: Race in the Closed City, 32 Soc. POL'Y 49 (2001)
(describing city redevelopment efforts and attributing racial tensions to "economic
apartheid"); Michelle Cottle, Boomerang: Did Integration Cause the Cincinnati Riots?, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 7, 2001, at 26 (noting that "Cincinnati has spent the last decade trying to turn
this pocket of urban poverty into a place where upper-income white folks come to eat, drink,
shop, and even live"); Louis Uchitelle, Long Before Recent Unrest, Cincinnati Simmered,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2001, at A16. But see Heather MacDonald, What Really Happened in
Cincinnati, CITY J., Summer 2001, at 28 (rejecting "gentrification" as cause of the race
riots). For a recent and thoughtful (partial) defense of land-use policies that lead to
gentrification, see Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 How. L.J. 405 (2003).
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B. The Norms of Work
Second, order-maintenance proponents argue that government must take
steps to reinvigorate the social norms that check physical and social disorder in
poor urban communities. But police efforts to suppress disorder are not the
only effective means of accomplishing that important goal. On the contrary,
reforming order-construction regulations can also bolster positive norms of
order, both by making the physical environment more conducive to private
monitoring 232 and, equally importantly, by eliminating regulatory barriers to
economic (especially entrepreneurial) activity in poor communities.
While social norms scholars blame the chaos plaguing inner-city
communities on the government's failure to enforce basic standards of decency
through the criminal law, other social scientists connect the persistent poverty,
crime, and disorder in poor urban neighborhoods with the lack of a "culture of
work. '233 For example, most inner-city residents endorse the importance of
individual initiative and hard work.2 34 But, people's faith in the efficacy of
such initiative may be undermined unless it is based on an observable
reality. 235 As a result of chronic joblessness, in other words, inner-city
residents develop what psychologists would term "negative self-efficacy"; they
wish to achieve success through work, but become so discouraged by the
reality of their community that they cease to believe that it is possible to do
so. 236 The economic effects of this phenomenon parallel the social-influence
effects of urban disorder. Just as visible disorder discourages law-abiders by
signaling that a community tolerates lawlessness, 237 widespread unemployment
signals that economic prospects are dim and disheartens job seekers.
The lack of a "culture of work" resulting from chronic joblessness
contributes to social disorder. As Wilson observes, work "constitutes a
framework for daily behavior and patterns of interaction because it imposes
232. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 10, at 1108-09.
233. See WILSON, supra note 162, at 51-86.
234. Id. at 67 (noting that nearly all of the respondents in the Urban Poverty and
Family Life Study (the source of Wilson's data) stated that "plain hard work" is important
for getting ahead).
235. See, e.g., CHARLES A. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY,
1950-1980, at 180 (1984) ("The principal ongoing incentive has been faith that investments
do pay off, based on what has happened to other people.") (emphasis in original); WILSON,
supra note 162, at 66 (discussing how economic isolation contributes to "ghetto-related
cultural traits").
236. See MIRIAM EREz & P. CHRISTOPHER EARLEY, CULTURE, SELF-IDENTITY, AND
WORK 99 (1993); Marta Tienda & Haya Stier, Joblessness and Shiftlessness: Labor Force
Activity in Chicago's Inner City, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 135 (Christopher Jencks &
Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991); see also Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human
Agency, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 122 (1983) (discussing self-efficacy theory); Schill, supra
note 114, at 502-22 (1993) (discussing theories explaining why concentrated poverty may
lead to a lack of perceived self-efficacy).
237. See, e.g., Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 7, at 369 (noting that "[v]isible
disorder is a self-reinforcing cue about the community's attitude toward crime").
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disciplines and regularities. '238 But "where jobs are scarce . . . many people
eventually lose their feeling of connectedness to work in the formal economy;
they no longer expect work to be a regular, and regulating, force in their
lives. ' '239 Work determines where we are going to be and when we are going to
be there; the lives of those without regular employment become less coherent,
not just economically, but socially as well. In one of the earliest studies of the
effects of long-term unemployment, Marie Jahoda, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and
Hans Zeisel chronicled how Depression-era unemployment affected the small
industrial community of Marienthal, Austria. 240 The study demonstrated that
prolonged and overwhelming unemployment devastated the cultural life of the
community. Residents who once participated wholeheartedly in community
and political life "lost the material and moral incentives to make use of their
time" and "drift[ed] gradually out of an ordered existence into one that is
undisciplined and empty."' 24 1 The same phenomenon occurs in inner-city
communities. The study which formed the basis of Wilson's work in Chicago
found that unemployed men and women "'were consistently less likely to
participate in local institutions and have mainstream friends [that is, friends
who are working, have some college education, and are married] than people in
other classes.'
242
Furthermore, sociological and psychological evidence suggests that
persistent unemployment makes it more difficult for parents to reinforce norms
favoring law-abiding behavior. This story is a familiar one. When a community
lacks appropriate "role models"--when children observe that drug dealing and
gang membership are the easiest paths to success and respect-parents find it
more difficult to inculcate mainstream values. This is particularly true if the
parents themselves are jobless. 243 As Wilson observes:
The more often certain behavior such as the pursuit of illegal income is
manifested in a community, the greater will be the readiness on the part of
some residents of the community to find that behavior "not only convenient
but morally appropriate." They may endorse mainstream norms against this
behavior in the abstract, but then find compelling reasons and justifications for
238. See WILSON, supra note 162, at 73.
239. Id. at 52.
240. MARIE JAHODA ET AL., MARIENTHAL: THE SOCIOGRAPHY OF AN UNEMPLOYED
COMMUNITY (1971).
241. WILSON, supra note 162, at 73-74 (discussing study).
242. Id. at 65; see also Cathy J. Cohen & Michael C. Dawson, Neighborhood Poverty
and African American Politics, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 286, 292 (1993) (connecting poverty
and lack of political participation).
243. See Mary Corcoran et al., The Association Between Men 's Economic Status and
Their Family and Community Origins, 27 J. HUM. RESOURCES 575, 592 (1992) (connecting
parents' welfare dependency and children's achievements); Martha S. Hill & Greg J.
Duncan, Parental Family Income and the Socioeconomic Attainment of Children, 16 Soc.
Sci. RES. 39, 48-49 (1987) (arguing that parental success improves their "role model
function" among children).
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this behavior, given the circumstances in their community. 244
Chronic joblessness has also been linked with the breakdown of the family,
which itself correlates with self-destructive behavior among young people. 245
Most social scientists, moreover, argue that the "sprawl" phenomenon
discussed above has resulted in a "spatial mismatch" between low-income
inner-city residents and low-skilled service jobs in the suburbs. 246 Because city
residents lack information about available jobs24 7-as well as a reliable way to
get to them 24 8-these jobs are, as a practical matter, unavailable. Thus, Wilson
and others have suggested that neighborhood jobs and businesses are critical to
reestablishing the "culture of work" that reinforces public order. The
recollections of older inner-city residents about their neighborhood's better
days support this conclusion.249 These residents tend to connect the loss of
social order in their communities to the decline of economic activity. They
recall a time when their community was safe and healthy, precisely because
local businesses made it-as Jacobs would predict-vibrant. In other words,
rethinking how land-use regulations may affect the availability of legitimate
alternatives to criminal entrepreneurism may serve a function similar to
dispersing loitering gang members and excluding drug dealers from troubled
communities-that is, enhancing the social norms that keep disorder in check.
C. The Social Influence Effects of Law Avoidance
Third, order-construction regulations, like all land-use regulations, are
244. WILSON, supra note 162, at 70.
245. See, e.g., Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, Teenage Underclass Behavior and
Subsequent Poverty: Have the Rules Changed?, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note
236, at 155, 157; Robert J. Sampson, Urban Black Violence: The Effect of Male Joblessness
and Family Disruption, 93 AM, J. Soc. 348 (1987); Mark Testa & Marilyn Krogh, The Effect
of Employment on Marriage Among Black Males in Inner-City Chicago, in THE DECLINE IN
MARRIAGE AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 59-95 (M. Belinda Tucker & Claudia Mitchell-Kernan eds., 1995).
246. On the spatial mismatch hypothesis, see generally PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY
AND PLACE (1996); Richard Arnott, Economic Theory and the Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis,
35 URB. STUD. 1171, 1171-72 (1998); Harry J. Holzer, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis:
What Has the Evidence Shown?, 28 URB. STUD. 105, 107 (1991), Keith R. Ihlanfeldt &
David L. Sjoquist, The Effect of Job Access on Black and White Youth Employment: A
Cross-Sectional Analysis, 28 URB. STUD. 255, 256 (1991) (reviewing literature); John F.
Kain, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Three Decades Later, 3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE
371 (1994); John D. Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass, 501 ANNALS
AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 26, 26-47 (1989); Schill, supra note 112, at 798-808 (1991);
Brian D. Taylor & Paul M. Ong, Spatial Mismatch or Automobile Mismatch? An
Examination of Race, Residence, and Commuting in US Metropolitan Areas, 32 URB. STUD.
1453 (1995).
247. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY,
AND THE UNDERCLASS 123 (1992).
248. See Garnett, The Road from Welfare to Work, supra note 117, at 217-28.
249. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
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routinely disregarded; enforcement usually is sporadic and complaint-
driven. 250 For the reasons set forth above, residents of poor communities have
much to gain from reforming these regulations. The cost of complying with the
regulations may price many would-be entrepreneurs out of the market. For this
reason, the residents also have the most to lose from these regulations'
enforcement. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect high levels of law avoidance
and low levels of enforcement in poor communities. Poor entrepreneurs have
an economic incentive to disregard these rules; their neighbors, understanding
this incentive (and operating under it as well) may be less motivated to report
regulatory infractions.
It is important to consider this probability in light of the negative social-
influence effects of widespread, visible law avoidance. Put simply, social-
influence theory predicts that people will be law-abiding when they perceive
that their neighbors are obeying the law.2 51 This is one way in which
depolicing advocates may have erred; the private deterrence measures that they
advocated-neighborhood watch groups, bars on windows, etc.-may signal
the prevalence of crime and thus "erode deterrence by emboldening law-
breakers and demoralizing law-abiders. ' 252 Similarly, widespread regulatory
avoidance may send mixed signals about community members' attitudes
toward complying with the law generally. The broken windows hypothesis
itself suggests that relatively minor legal infractions (e.g., vandalism and public
drunkenness) can create an environment that fosters more serious crime.
253
The broken windows hypothesis also suggests that law avoidance alone
may not warrant legal reforms. After all, the decriminalization of minor (and
250. See, e.g., PLATT, supra note 192, at 296 ("Zoning has particularly been criticized
for procedural inadequacies: lax enforcement, favoritism, lack of consistency with planning,
and excessive rigidity in some cases and undue flexibility in others."); Eric T. Freyfogle,
Real Estate Sales and the New Implied Warranty of Lawful Use, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1
(1985) ("The enforcement of land use restraints ...is often haphazard. Municipalities
usually do not check a property for ordinance and code violations unless someone files a
complaint or requests an inspection."); Gamett, On Castles, supra note 18, at 1228 (noting
that zoning enforcement is notoriously lax and frequently complaint-driven); Richard A.
Wexler, "A Zoning Ordinance Is No Better than Its Administration "-A Platitude Proved, 1
J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 74, 75 (1967); R.F. Babcock, The Chaos of Zoning
Administration, ZONING DIG., Dec. 1960, at 1.
251. See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social
Disapproval, and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980). The term "social influence" describes a commonplace
phenomenon-that our behavior is shaped by, and frequently conforms to, our perceptions
of others' behavior. See, e.g., Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 7, at 352; see also, e.g.,
ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 6 (7th ed. 1995) (defining "social influence"); DAVID
J. SCHNEIDER, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 306 (1988) (same).
252. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 7, at 387.
253. See, e.g., Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 581 (describing theory
that "neighborhood disorder is linked both to fear and more serious crime"); see also
SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 1-84 (purporting to provide empirical support for the crime-
disorder connection).
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likely prevalent) public-order offenses like public drunkenness contributed to
the disorder plaguing many urban communities. 254 When the negatives of
regulatory avoidance are considered together with the positives of the reforms
discussed above, however, the case for legal reform becomes much stronger.
Hopefully, these reforms would not simply legalize innocent disorder, but
rather would stimulate the social and economic activity necessary for healthy,
and orderly, community life. If so, changing the law to recognize the land-use
realities of poor neighborhoods (e.g., many women are paid to care for children
in their homes) might actually do more to reinforce norms favoring law-abiding
behavior more than the regulatory status quo.
D. Diffusing the "Us v. Them " Perception
Finally, and importantly, order-maintenance proponents repeatedly
confront the argument that broken windows tactics unfairly single out minority
communities and their residents. While it is likely true, as Tracey Meares and
Dan Kahan have forcefully argued elsewhere, that poor minority communities
have the most to gain from order-restoration efforts, 255 it is also true that
minorities continue to be more distrustful of police efforts in their communities
than white Americans.2 56 The linking of well-publicized police abuses-such
as the notorious Abner Louima case 257-to broken windows policing
understandably heightens these concerns. 258 For this reason, order-maintenance
proponents caution against policing tactics that single out minority
communities for extreme measures, such as law-enforcement "crackdowns"
that send "'warriors' to intervene ... as strangers" into a community on a one-
time basis. 259 Such efforts may backfire by alienating those that they seek to
assist.260 Community policing seeks to diffuse these tensions by encouraging
254. See generally KELLING & COLES, supra note 6, at 43-49 (attributing growth in
urban disorder in part to decriminalization of drunkenness).
255. See, e.g., Meares & Kahan, Paradox, supra note 32, at 21 (arguing that "the worst
consequence of the ongoing commitment to the 1960s conception of rights may be its
disempowering effect on inner-city communities"); see also George L. Kelling, A Policing
Strategy New Yorkers Like, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2002, at A23 (citing poll data suggesting that
African-American and Hispanic New Yorkers support order-maintenance policing to greater
extent than whites).
256. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 25-28 (1997).
257. Abner Louima is a Haitian-American who was sexually brutalized by several New
York City police officers following his arrest. Dan Barry, Officer Charged in Man's Torture
at Station House, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997, at Al; see Harcourt, supra note 9, at 378-80
(linking Louima case and rise of police brutality charges generally to New York City's
order-maintenance policing).
258. See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 49, at 63, 63-69; Harcourt, supra note 9, at 377-81.
259. KELLING & COLES, supra note 6, at 96-97 (warning against sweeps and
crackdowns where "'warriors' intervene.., as strangers" in a neighborhood).
260. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. SCOTT, THE BENEFITS AND CONSEQUENCES OF POLICE
CRACKDOWNS 16-17 (2003) (noting that "crackdowns can worsen police-community
relations and thereby undermine police legitimacy"), available at http://
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residents to work with police to identify and prioritize community problems.2 61
As Livingston observes, "The police look to the community in formulating
police initiatives; broad authorization, at the neighborhood level, is deemed
essential to involving the police significantly in efforts to lessen disorder
problems. '262 It remains the case, however, that resulting order-maintenance
policies occasionally place police officers in an adversarial position with
members of the very community identifying the targeted "disorders."
The land-use reforms outlined in this Article represent another opportunity
to dispel these tensions. These legal reforms seek to bolster social norms not by
recriminalizing disorder, but rather by eliminating regulations that may stand in
the way of a healthier economic and social climate in our poorest communities.
This richer, more constructive, understanding of the public-order puzzle--one
that includes more than efforts to crack down on disorder--could further
broaden community support for order-restoration efforts generally.
263
IV. LAND-USE REFORM AS A COMMUNITY-POLICING ISSUE
Thus far, this Article has explored how property regulation affects efforts
to restore order in America's urban cores. The Article has sought first to
illustrate how property regulations are being used to suppress the physical
decline linked to social disorder and second to examine the implications of
local officials' natural tendency to equate the particular order constructed by
zoning laws with the absence of disorder. Importantly, Parts II and III of the
Article suggest reasons that the zealous enforcement of order-construction
regulations may ultimately impede, rather than augment, order-maintenance
efforts. But, even if untangling the disorder-suppression/order-construction
equation is a good idea, the above discussion makes clear the significant
cultural and institutional impediments to legal reforms along these lines.
For all the reasons outlined above, the deconstruction of city land uses may
prove critical to order-restoration efforts in some poor communities. Therefore,
it is imperative for city officials and community leaders to explore ways to
overcome the impediments to implementing such reforms. The broad trend in
local government law toward the devolution of authority to "sublocal"
institutions264 presents interesting opportunities to accomplish that important
goal. Sublocal evaluations of the order-construction/disorder-suppression
equation are particularly appropriate in light of the fact that large cities tend to
be made up of numerous distinctive urban enclaves. It therefore is reasonable
www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=964 (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
261. See, e.g., Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 575-84.
262. Id. at 564.
263. Such support is widely acknowledged to be critical to the success of these efforts.
See, e.g., Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 565-91 (discussing order-
maintenance policies).
264. See generally, e.g., Briffault, supra note 140.
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to believe that the residents' regulatory "tastes" vary from neighborhood to
neighborhood. In fact, several scholars have elsewhere used neighborhood
distinctiveness to advocate devolving certain decisions about land-use
regulation to neighborhood institutions similar to the now-popular "business
improvement districts," which themselves have been enlisted to help
implement the order-maintenance agenda. 26 5
Short of creating new neighborhood institutions with legislative authority
over land use, one possibility is to broaden the agenda of the community-
policing discussions that have become central to formulating order-
maintenance policies in most cities. These discussions could provide a forum
within which community members consider how land-use regulations shape the
order of urban neighborhoods. As discussed above, community-policing theory
encourages local residents to work with police to identify and target disorders
that impede community renewal. Community policing is not perfect-indeed,
even its strongest proponents admit that, in some cases, it "has come to mean
all things to all people. '266 Ideally, however, community-policing efforts begin
with discussions asking community members to identify problems that
traditional law enforcement strategies may overlook or discount. And, one
benefit of this model is that, theoretically, everything is on the table, including
priorities that traditionally were not classified as "law enforcement"
problems.26
7
Not surprisingly, in light of the evidence linking property disorder and
crime discussed above, community-policing efforts have led to the increased
use of disorder-suppression regulations in some communities. For example,
when Baltimore, Maryland, instituted a formal community-policing program a
decade ago, residents of the struggling Boyd Booth neighborhood immediately
identified property decay and abandonment as a priority. As a result of
discussions with Boyd Booth residents, state and local officials provided funds
for boarding up vacant housing, erecting fences, improving lighting, and
265. See GEORGE W. LIEBMANN, THE LITTLE PLATOONS: SUB-LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN
MODERN HISTORY 143 (1995); Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods,
48 DuKE L.J. 75 (1998) (arguing for retrofitting residential community associations to urban
neighborhoods); George W. Liebmann, Devolution of Power to Community and Block
Associations, 25 URB. LAW. 335, 343-46 (1993); Robert Nelson, Privatizing the
Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to
Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 866-67 (1999) (arguing for the
devolution of land-use regulation to community groups in inner-city areas). On business
improvement districts, see generally Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time?
Business Improvement Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 365, 370
(1999). Such a solution may be unnecessary given the extent of neighborhood input into
local land-use decisions even absent the additional layer of "urban federalism." See, e.g.,
Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REv. 839, 893-909 (1983).
266. See KELLING & COLES, supra note 6, at 158.
267. See id.; Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 575-77 (discussing
community-policing theory and practice).
[Vol. 57:1
ORDERING (AND ORDER IN) THE CITY
making cosmetic improvements in the neighborhood. A local public interest
group helped residents pursue public nuisance actions against drug houses and
take legal actions against negligent landlords. And the neighborhood
association established a summer jobs program that focused on cleaning public
spaces.268 After these reforms, crime decreased dramatically in the community,
and residents testified that they no longer feared leaving their homes.
269
Thanks to the ascendancy of community-policing practices, these citizen-
government discussions now are being carried out in hundreds of poor
neighborhoods throughout the country. 270 And there is no reason why disorder
suppression should be the only subject on the table. Just as Boyd Booth
residents prioritized property abandonment, residents elsewhere could be
encouraged-as part of broader discussions about order-maintenance
priorities-to consider the ways in which order-construction regulations shape
their neighborhoods, for good and ill. This is precisely what happened in East
Harlem. While the effort there was not formally part of a "community
policing" program, the recent land-use reforms there grew out of broader
discussions about various priorities, including the need to restore the "quality
of life" for area residents and residents' own recognition that some order-
construction regulations drained the area of needed vitality.271 As a result,
community leaders identified order-construction regulations that stood in the
way of renewal and proposed reforms to city regulators who embraced them.
Including the subject of land-use reform in community-policing
discussions elsewhere could empower residents to critically examine how
order-construction and disorder-suppression regulations shape the order of their
neighborhoods. Implementing the results of such discussions would require
local legislative action. But, hopefully, if community discussions generated a
formal land-use reform proposal, city officials would endeavor to overcome the
significant public-choice impediments to changing the order-construction
regime, as they did in response to the East Harlem proposal. Furthermore, the
results of neighborhood-by-neighborhood examinations of the order-
construction/disorder-suppression equation might serve to educate legislators
about the need for urban land-use reform.
What types of reforms might this process produce? Neighborhood
distinctiveness likely means that the results of such discussions would vary
dramatically from neighborhood to neighborhood. Some communities might
risk radical deregulation; others might fear the disruption of even minor
regulatory reforms. Still, the East Harlem experience suggests the types of
regulations that inner-city residents might view as problematic. As noted
above, residents there did not opt for radical deregulation; rather, they
268. The foregoing description comes from KELLING & COLES, supra note 6, at 197-98.
269. Id. at 198.
270. See Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 5, at 577 (discussing the prevalence
of community policing).
271. See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 21.
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advocated a relatively narrow set of reforms-a new commercial overlay zone,
the reduction of off-street parking requirements for businesses in commercial
overlays generally, and shallower setbacks in residential zones. The supporting
documents submitted to the city indicted the former regulations for standing in
the way of healthier, more orderly, community life.
2 72
Other communities might identify similarly counterproductive regulations.
Consider, for example, how order-construction regulations shape Chicago's
Englewood community. Most of Englewood is zoned "R-3" or "R-4," both
general residential districts allowing a mix of single and multifamily dwellings;
churches, convents, libraries, day-care centers, and community homes are also
permitted.27 3 The commercial establishments-restaurants, bars, food stores,
etc.-that Jacobs and others argue serve as "informal meeting places" and
foster healthy community life are prohibited in these zones. 274 These types of
establishments are permitted only along major thoroughfares, spaced
approximately eight blocks apart. 275 To the extent that such establishments
once existed in Englewood's residential districts as nonconforming uses, many
have since been eliminated by amortization rules. 276 Those that remain operate
under restrictions designed to make it difficult for them to continue operating:
buildings may be repaired but not altered or enlarged,2 77 a temporary
abandonment of the use results in the loss of the right to operate, etc.
278
Home occupations are permitted in Englewood's residential zones, but
several occupations that low-skilled individuals might find attractive, such as
automobile repair, work in barber and beauty shops, catering, contracting and
landscaping work, and light "piecemeal" manufacturing work, are expressly
prohibited.279 Even permitted occupations are strictly limited to work that is
"accessory and secondary to the use of a dwelling for residential purposes. '280
The business may comprise no more than ten percent of the floor area of the
home, or three hundred square feet, whichever is greater; 28 1 exterior buildings,
such as garages, may not be used (even for storage purposes). 282 In a poor
272. See id.
273. CHI., ILL. ZONING CODE §§ 7.3-7.4 (2004) (listing permitted uses).
274. Id. § 7.3-6 (listing uses permitted in R-6 residence district, but excluded from R-1
through R-5 districts).
275. See Dep't of Zoning, City of Chi., Chicago Zoning Maps (on file with author).
276. See CHI., ILL. ZONING CODE § 6.5-4 (1969) (providing that nonconforming uses in
residential structure are to be eliminated within fifteen years of enactment); see also id. §
6.4-8(5) (establishing amortization schedules for nonconforming uses in commercial
structures located in residence districts, which vary from twenty-five to sixty years).
277. CHI., ILL. ZONING CODE §§ 6.4-1, 6.4-2 (2004).
278. Id. § 6.4-4. A nonconforming use may be changed to a different type of
nonconforming use, provided that the intensity of the business does not increase. Id. § 6.4-7.
279. Id. § 4-380-070(a).
280. Id. § 4-380-060(b).
281. Id. § 4-380-060(g).
282. Id. § 4-380-060(f).
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community, where few have the luxury of space, these limitations alone likely
will prevent many individuals from working at home. And further restrictions
make it difficult even for those with the space to do so: residents may not hire
any employees to work in the business,283 alter their home in any way to
accommodate it,284 "display or create any external evidence of the operation of
the home occupation, '285 or welcome more than ten patrons per day.
286
Could changes in this regulatory landscape that admittedly make it appear
less orderly help create social and economic conditions that would bolster
order-maintenance efforts? A strong argument can be made that these order-
construction regulations are antithetical to the social and economic climate
necessary for healthy urban life. Substantial restrictions on home businesses
may impede the entrepreneurial efforts of residents who cannot afford
commercial office space. These regulations may also lower the level of activity
in residential neighborhoods. While this fact is generally used to justify limits
on home businesses, it might also be seen as negative. After all, as Jacobs
argued, social and commercial activity helps guarantee that urban
neighborhoods remain vibrant and safe. Home business patrons might provide
essential "eyes on the street" to keep disorder in check; home business
entrepreneurs may bolster healthy norms of work.287 Similarly, traditional
zoning rules treat "nonconforming uses"-such as businesses in residential
zones-as "disorders" to be eliminated over time, as illustrated by the Chicago
zoning regulations discussed above. While the goal of these regulations is to
impose uniformity (and thus to restore order), these restrictions may prove
counterproductive because they tend to discourage upkeep and lead to the
physical decline of buildings. They may also deprive neighborhoods of much-
needed social activity and commercial vitality.288
Finally, by virtue of the community's location on Manhattan Island, the
most dense urban center in the United States, the preexisting regulatory scheme
in East Harlem likely allowed more mixing of commercial and residential uses
than most zoning codes permit. Virtually all of the north-south streets, and a
handful of east-west streets, are designated commercial "overlay" zones. In less
dense, more typical, communities, such as Englewood, simply designating
"mixed-use" zones might address urban problems by increasing the amount of
283. Id. § 4-380-010(a).
284. Id. § 4-380-060(c), (e).
285. Id. § 4-380-060(d).
286. Id. § 4-380-110(a).
287. See Garnett, On Castles, supra note 18, at 1216-19 (discussing need for regulatory
reform in welfare-reform context); id. at 1222-28 (discussing commuhitarian arguments for
home businesses).
288. See, e.g., Arthur lentilucci, Pigs in the Parlor or Diamonds in the Rough? A New
Vision for Nonconformity Regulation, ZONING NEwS, Apr. 2003, at I (arguing that
traditional regulation of nonconformities, which aims to eliminate them, may contribute to
neighborhood decline and recommending regulatory flexibility).
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street-level activity in a neighborhood. 289 Some communities might also
identify public property regulations, especially ubiquitous restrictions on street
vending, as an impediment to community renewal.
290
CONCLUSION
The physical/geographic order imposed by zoning has long been equated
with the absence of the social disorders targeted by order-maintenance efforts.
This Article has explored various reasons to question whether, in some cases,
the opposite may be true, i.e., whether zoning rules might actually impede
efforts to eliminate the social disorders plaguing many urban communities. The
order constructed by our prevailing system of land-use regulation arguably
deprives many urban neighborhoods of the economic and social vitality that is
critical to true renewal: mixed-use environments tend to encourage healthy
informal social interaction that itself suppresses disorder; single-use zones
discourage it. Order-construction regulations also may contribute to the dire
economic situation in many inner-city communities by pricing many would-be
entrepreneurs out of the market: while such "bootstrap capitalists" might
provide hopeful examples for their neighbors, their absence can itself lead to
despair that fosters disorder.
Of course, a community wary of disorder may resist changes to the order
constructed by zoning laws. This is an understandable, if unfortunate, impulse.
Yet the East Harlem experience demonstrates that such resistance can be
(imperfectly) overcome when community leaders themselves come to view
land-use laws as impediments to community development. Perhaps the types of
discussions that led to the reforms in East Harlem could be integrated into the
community-policing forums that are central to implementing the broader order-
maintenance agenda. Such discussions would encourage more communities to
consider how the ordering constructed by land-use regulations affects efforts to
reduce physical and social disorder in our cities. At the very least, the current
focus on restoring order in our cities hopefully will present opportunities to ask
what the "public order" is-and to critically reevaluate how our property
regulations shape it.
289. The growing number of cities which have designated "mixed-use" zones reflects
the new urbanists' growing influence. See, e.g., City of Albuquerque, Mixed-Use Zoning
Proposals, at http://www.cabq.gov/planning/pages/devprocess/muzone.html (last visited
Sept. 26, 2004); CIr OF COLORADO SPRINGS, MIXED-USE ZONING AND STREET STANDARDS
(2001), http://www.springsgov.com/units/planning/CurrentProj/CompPlan/CodeExecSum
.pdf (last visited Sept.26, 2004); FORT WORTH S. INC., MIXED-USE ZONING IN THE CITY OF
FORT WORTH: A GUIDE TO FORT WORTH's MIXED-USE ZONING CLASSIFICATIONS, http:I/
www.fortworthsouth.org/mixeduse.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2004); Steve Lewis, Zoning
Trends: The Mixed-Use Puzzle, RETAIL TRAFFIC, May 1, 2002, at http://retailtrafficmag.com/
ar/retail_zoning-trends mixeduse/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
290. See, e.g., Regina Austin, "An Honest Living": Street Vendors, Municipal
Regulation, and the Black Public Square, 103 YALE L.J. 2119, 2122-25 (1994).
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